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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
CAN COMPENSATION COMMITTEES EFFECTIVELY MITIGATE THE CEO
HORIZON PROBLEM? THE ROLE OF CO-OPTED DIRECTORS
by
Ruonan Liu
Florida International University, 2014
Miami, Florida
Professor Stephen Lin, Major Professor
Extant research finds inconclusive evidence about the CEO horizon problem. One
possibility is that compensation committees design CEO compensation in a way that
discourages retiring CEOs from opportunistic earnings management and R&D reduction.
However, compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors may not be as
effective as those with fewer co-opted directors in mitigating the CEO horizon problem,
because directors co-opted by the CEO tend to bias their decisions in favor of the CEO. I
find that compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors are associated with
higher CEO compensation packages. I document R&D reduction and accruals
management in firms with retiring CEOs and compensation committees dominated by coopted directors, and find that R&D reduction and income-increasing accruals are less
discouraged by compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors when
deciding CEO compensation. I also examine the effect of boards of directors and
compensation committee characteristics on CEO compensation and on mitigating the
CEO horizon problem. I find that CEO compensation positively associates with CEO
power, director independence, and the percentage of busy directors, and negatively
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associates with board of directors and committee size and director ownership. Moreover,
I find that retiring CEOs are more likely to reduce R&D expenditures when CEOs have
more power, and director tenure is longer; retiring CEOs in firms with large boards of
directors and compensation committees are less likely to manage accruals.
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INTRODUCTION
Due to the separation of ownership and control in corporations, the interests of a
CEO may deviate from the interests of the corporation’s shareholders. To reduce any
problems that may arise from this deviation, boards of directors typically act as monitors
to reduce agency problems. For example, the compensation committee, a subcommittee
of the board of directors, is responsible for designing CEO compensation packages that
can align the interests between shareholders and the CEO. However, not all compensation
committees are equally effective. “Co-opted directors” are defined as the directors
appointed after a CEO assumes office. CEOs may use their influence over the director
appointment process to co-opt directors who share some similarities or ties with them.
Therefore, the co-opted directors are more likely to feel sympathetic to the CEO. In
addition, the co-opted directors may be less willing to challenge their CEO since they
believe they owe their board seats to him or her. As a result, the co-opted directors are
less effective monitors (Coles et al., 2014). This study examines whether compensation
committees’ effectiveness at mitigating the CEO problem is diminished when the
majority of the committee is made up by co-opted directors.
CEOs with earnings-based compensation may focus on boosting firms’ short-term
performance by cutting R&D spending or engaging in accruals management. However,
these opportunistic behaviors have a negative effect on a firm’s value. This problem
becomes more severe in CEOs’ final years prior to retirement, when they are less
concerned with their reputation in the job market. However, compensation committees
can adjust CEO compensation to alleviate opportunistic R&D reduction (Cheng, 2004)
and opportunistic accruals management (Huson et al., 2012). If the co-opted directors are
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less effective, the compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors may be less
responsive to the CEO horizon problem.
Using a sample of 13,606 firm-year observations for S&P 1500 firms from 1998
to 2011, I find that CEO compensation is likely to be higher if compensation committees
are dominated by co-opted directors. I find evidence of R&D reduction and accruals
management in firms with retiring CEOs and in compensation committees dominated by
co-opted directors. Further, I find that R&D reduction and income-increasing accruals are
less discouraged when determining the compensation for retiring CEOs by compensation
committees that are dominated by co-opted directors.
My findings are robust to alternative measures of the compensation committee cooption and additional controls of corporate governance. CEOs’ direct involvement in the
director nomination process has reduced since 2004, after the NYSE Corporate
Governance Section 303A, NASDAQ Rule 4350 (c), and AMEX Enhanced Corporate
Governance Rules, section 805 required that nomination committees of listing firms must
solely consist of independent directors. Despite this reduction in CEO direct involvement,
I still find evidence that compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors are
less effective in reducing CEO compensation and mitigating accruals management when
CEOs approach retirement in the subsample firm-year observations during the period
2004-20111.
I also investigate whether board and compensation committee characteristics are
associated with CEO compensation and the CEO horizon problem using a principal
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One possibility is that the CEO can still exert indirect influence. Another explanation may be that the
results are driven by the directors appointed before the year of 2004.

2

components analysis. I find evidence that CEO compensation positively correlates with
CEO power and busy directors, while negatively correlating with director ownership. In
addition, I find that both CEO power and director tenure increase the likelihood of R&D
curtailment when CEOs approach retirement. I also find that the size of the board of
directors and the compensation committee affect the likelihood of accruals management
when companies face a CEO horizon problem.
This study contributes in three ways. First, it reveals that although many
organizations reduce their CEOs’ direct involvement in the appointment process of new
directors, co-opted directors are weak monitors. Coles et al. (2014) find evidence that
board co-option reduces monitoring effectiveness. Since the design of CEO compensation
packages is delegated to compensation committees, I focus on the role of co-opted
directors on compensation committees. Second, the study adds empirical evidence to the
debate of organizations’ CEO horizon problem. Extant literature finds mixed evidence of
the horizon problem, which may be due to the intervention of compensation committees
or failure to identify when the horizon problem is the most severe. The results provide
evidence that retiring CEOs engage in opportunistic R&D cutting and income-increasing
accruals management when compensation committees are less effective. Finally, the
study adds to the literature on corporate governance, revealing that compensation
committees play an important role in mitigating an organization’s CEO horizon problem
by adjusting CEO compensation. Cheng (2004) and Huson et al. (2012) discover that
compensation committees intervene to mitigate an organization’s CEO horizon problem
by studying the association between CEO compensation and the CEO horizon problem.
However, these two studies do not directly investigate compensation committees.
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Moreover, they assume all compensation committee are effective. My findings suggest
that the effectiveness of compensation committees in mitigating an organization’s CEO
horizon problem is contingent on the quality of compensation committees.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents a literature
review; Chapter 3 discusses the hypothesis development; Chapter 4 describes the
research design; Chapter 5 reports the study’s sample population and empirical results;
and Chapter 6 discusses the roles of boards of directors and compensation committees in
designing CEO compensation packages. The final section concludes the paper with a
discussion about the significance of the findings.

1. LITERATURE REVIEW
1.1 Horizon Problem
A manager’s tenure is much shorter than a firm’s lifespan. When managers have
shorter horizons than a firm’s optimal investment horizon, managers prefer to engage
projects with lower net present value but with higher current earnings, which would
maximize the manager’s bonus compensation. This is what is known as a horizon
problem, according to Smith and Watts (1982). In other words, managers with shorter
horizons are myopic; they tend to focus on increasing the firm’s short-term earnings. At
the beginning of their career, managers are concerned with reputation. Fama (1980)
argues that managers are disciplined by the labor market because their human capital
depends on the success of the firm. Therefore, CEOs care more about the firm’s longterm success. However, as managers approach retirement, they have weaker career
concerns and therefore the horizon problem is more severe (Gibbons and Murphy, 1992).
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Horizon problem predicts that retiring CEOs may reduce R&D expenditures or
involve in accruals management to maximize their earnings-based compensation,
irrespective of the impact on the long-term benefits of the shareholders. However, extant
literature finds mixed evidence of R&D reduction and accruals management. Effective
since 1974, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) require companies to
expense R&D expenditures in the year that they are incurred. However, the benefits from
R&D investment take years to be fully realized. Therefore, reducing R&D expenditures
results in the increase of current-year accounting earnings. Dechow and Sloan (1991)
finds empirical evidence of R&D reduction prior to CEO departures for a sample of firms
with large R&D expenditures and CEO compensation based on earnings performance for
firm-years from 1974 to 1988. They suggest that CEOs reduce R&D expenditures to
increase their earnings-based compensation in the years prior to CEO departures, which
is consistent with the CEO horizon problem. They find no evidence that the R&D
reductions around CEO departures are driven by poor firm performance or because the
outgoing CEOs leave new investment initiatives to the incoming CEOs. Specifically, they
find that CEOs who leave the company after they reach mandatory retirement age and
thus anticipate departure, reduce R&D expenditures even more. They also find similar
reductions in advertising expenditures but not in capital expenditures, which do not affect
earnings immediately as R&D expenditures.
However, Murphy and Zimmerman (1993) suggest that the reductions in R&D
expenditures preceding CEO departures are driven by poor firm performance rather than
horizon problems. Dechow and Sloan (1991) use a small, selected sample of firms in
R&D intensive industries. Murphy and Zimmerman (1993) examine a larger sample of
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CEO turnovers from the Forbes annual surveys during 1971 to 1989; they find that the
growth rate of R&D in the CEO’s transition year (in which the old CEOs depart and the
new CEOs assume office), and the CEO’s last full year (the year before the transition
year) is not significantly different from the three years before the CEO’s last full year.
They find no evidence of R&D reductions in the transition year and the last full year after
controlling for firm performance, and no evidence of R&D reduction preceding CEO
turnover for the subsample of CEO turnovers unrelated to poor firm performance.
Also contrary to CEO horizon problem predictions, Gibbons and Murphy (1992)
find that firms spend most on R&D and advertising in the CEO’s last year prior to
retirement. They find that the level of R&D expenditures increases, but the R&D growth
rate decreases as CEOs approach retirement. They further argue that the declining R&D
growth rate prior to retirement is not driven by the CEO horizon problem, because they
do not find an increase in concurrent earnings. Butler and Newman (1989) fail to find
evidence of R&D reductions in the sample of firms with CEOs in their final year before
departures compared with a matched sample of firms; they also fail to provide empirical
evidence for the CEO horizon problem. They suggest that their findings do not identify
when the CEO horizon problem is most severe.
Consistent with the CEO horizon problem, several studies find a negative
association between CEO age or tenure and R&D expenditures and suggest that CEOs
reduce R&D as they grow older (Barker and Mueller, 2002; Lundstrum, 2002; Naveen,
2006; Demers and Wang, 2009). However, Cazier (2011) points out the problems with
these studies’ research design. He identifies two factors that induce a negative bias
between CEO age and R&D expenditures in the cross-section, and thus erroneously
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support the CEO horizon problem. He finds that: 1) firms that invest more in R&D are
more likely to be delisted, so firms with CEOs who are older or have longer tenure invest
less in R&D; and 2) firms that invest more in R&D are more likely to hire younger CEOs.
He examines CEO retirement rather than CEO age and finds that CEOs do not reduce
R&D in the five years prior to their retirement.
Two recent studies, which argue that CEOs may use discretionary accruals to
increase contemporaneous earnings, provide support for the CEO horizon problem
(Kalyta, 2009; Antia et al., 2010). In a sample of Fortune 1000 firms from 1997 to 2006,
Kalyta (2009) finds evidence of income-increasing accruals management in the years
prior to CEO retirement only when the CEO’s Supplemental Executive Retirement Plan
(SERP) is contingent on firm performance. His findings suggest that if CEOs have
performance-contingent SERPs, they have a more powerful incentive to boost firm
earnings in the final years prior to retirement, in which SERPs pensionable earnings are
determined. He finds negative market reaction only after the retirement of the CEO with
a performance-contingent SERP. Antia et al. (2010) use CEO expected tenures to proxy
CEO decision horizons and argue that shorter CEO horizons are associated with greater
agency costs, higher information risk, and less market valuation. They find that accruals
management is negatively associated with CEO decision horizons, which is consistent
with horizon problems, and which leads to more accruals management.
However, several studies find inconsistencies with outgoing CEOs who boost
earnings by involving income-increasing accruals management. Pourciau (1993)
classifies CEO turnovers as routine turnovers in which a successor is chosen, or several
contestants are identified; and non-routine turnovers, which include voluntary and
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involuntary resignations. He focused on the non-routine CEO turnovers and found
income-decreasing accruals and write-offs before the non-routine CEO turnovers. One
reason for these results is that his model fails to control for firm performance. Murphy
and Zimmerman (1993) did control for firm performance, and found a significant
negative association between accruals and the transition year dummy. But after further
controlling for the endogeneity of CEO turnover, no significant association is found. In a
sample of Australian firms, Wells (2002) does not find income-increasing accruals
management prior to CEO turnover, despite whether the turnovers are routine or nonroutine. In addition, he finds no evidence of income-increasing earnings management
through non-current asset sales or abnormal and ordinary items before the CEO routine
and non-routine turnovers.

1.2 The Role of the Compensation Committee
The CEO horizon problem is one example of the conflict of interests between
managers and shareholders. Shareholders cannot directly monitor managers, so they trust
the board of directors with monitoring responsibilities (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen
and Meckling, 1976). As a subcommittee of the board of directors, the compensation
committee is given the task of designing a compensation package that aligns the interests
between shareholders and managers and therefore alleviates CEO horizon problem.
A firm’s compensation committee is responsible for determining and overseeing
the executive compensation process. For example, Apple Inc. describes the functions of
its compensation committee in a proxy statement for its 2014 annual meeting of
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shareholders as “reviewing the compensation arrangements for the Company’s executive
officers, including the CEO, administering the Company’s equity compensation plans,
and reviewing the Board’s compensation. The compensation committee’s authority to
grant equity awards may not be delegated to the Company’s management or others”
(Apple Inc. Proxy Statement of 2012). Hermanson et al. (2012) interview 17
compensation committee chairs and three compensation committee members of public
firms about the compensation committee process. According to the interviewees, one
responsibility of the compensation committee is to oversee CEO compensation. Several
studies also empirically support the important role that the compensation committee plays
in designing CEO compensation (e.g., O'Reilly et al., 1988).
Accounting income is one of the performance measures used to determine CEO
compensation (Lambert and Larcker, 1987). Prior research provides evidence that when
compensation committees determine CEO compensation based on accounting income,
they treat income items differently. In fact, they sometimes shield certain income items,
for example, restructuring charges (Dechow et al., 1994; Adut et al., 2003), and even
reward CEOs for certain expenditures that reduce income (Cheng 2004). More
importantly, the different treatments are based on individual circumstances. Balsam
(1998) examines the association between different components of earnings and CEO cash
compensation, and finds that when including CEO cash compensation, the weight on
discretionary accruals is relatively lower than the weight on nondiscretionary accruals,
which in turn is lower than the weight on operating cash flows. He also shows that the
weight of positive discretionary accruals is higher than negative discretionary accruals,
indicating that compensation committees reward CEOs for positive discretionary accruals
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while avoiding punishing CEOs for negative discretionary accruals. He further
documents that compensation committees reward CEOs for positive discretionary
accruals even more if the firms need to meet an earnings target. Gaver and Gaver (1998)
examine the weight of above-the-line earnings and below-the-line earnings when
including CEO cash compensation. Their findings suggest that above-the-line and belowthe-line gains are included while above-the-line and below-the-line losses are excluded
from CEO cash compensation. They separately examine unusual transactions,
extraordinary transactions, and discontinued operations, for which gains are included
while losses are excluded from CEO cash compensation.
In a sample of firms reporting restructuring charges between 1982 and 1989,
Dechow et al. (1994) specifically examine whether compensation committees shield CEO
cash compensation from restructuring charges, which are reported as a component of
income from continuing operations. They argue that restructuring charges can enhance
firm value, but those costs reduce current earnings. Their findings suggest that CEO
compensation is shielded from restructuring charges, especially when the restructuring
charges are not frequent and the CEO has a shorter expected horizon. This is consistent
with the compensation committees’ adjustment for the income-decreasing effects of
restructuring charges. Following Dechow et al. (1994), Adut et al. (2003) find that
compensation committees partially shield CEO compensation from restructuring charges
after controlling for growth in CEO compensation for their sample between 1982 and
1997, and the degree of shielding varies depending on the CEO tenure and how close the
current restructuring charge is to the prior restructuring charge. Generally, Adut et al.
(2003) find less shielding if the restructuring charges are more likely to be opportunistic
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in nature. Duru et al. (2002) attempt to explain the reason of this shielding by analyzing
the agency model. Their analysis suggests that if evaluated based on income with no
adjustments, managers have no incentives to invest in value-enhancing but incomedecreasing activities. In addition, they provide empirical evidence that compensation
committees shield recurring expenditures, such as R&D and advertising expenditures,
and R&D expenditures are more filtered than advertising expenditures from CEO cash
compensation.
Compensation committees treat CEOs differently, providing various incentives
for CEOs. Balsam (1998) reveals that when a CEO’s compensation is tied closely to
earnings, then the CEO is more likely to use discretionary accruals to boost earnings.
Cheng (2004) finds that the association between changes in R&D spending and changes
in value of CEO annual option grants is significantly positive when the CEO approaches
retirement and when the firm faces a small decline in earnings and a small loss, but
insignificant when there is no horizon problem or myopia problem. Cheng’s (2004)
findings indicate that compensation committees mitigate opportunistic R&D reduction by
rewarding (penalizing) CEOs for increasing (reducing) R&D expenditures when a firm is
faced with a CEO horizon problem and myopia problem. Huson et al. (2012) find that
compensation committees are able to place a lower relative weight on the positive change
in discretionary accruals compared with other components of earnings when setting CEO
cash pay during the years before CEO voluntary turnovers. They claim that compensation
committees

allow

income-increasing

discretionary

accruals

to

increase

CEO

compensation the same way as other earnings components during non-terminal years,
since the reverse feature of accruals will reduce CEO compensation in the subsequent
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years. However, when fewer possibilities reverse accruals, compensation committees
intervene to reduce the relative weight on the increase of discretionary accruals when
they decide a CEO’s cash compensation in his or her terminal years. They also show that
Selling, General, and Administration (SG&A) expenditures are at least partially shielded
from CEO compensation in the non-terminal years, but not shielded at all in the terminal
years. Their results are consistent with the idea that compensation committees generally
encourage spending in SG&A but less so during a CEO’s terminal years.
Collectively, the prior literature shows that compensation committees use
discretion to adjust CEO compensation to mitigate adverse incentives for CEOs.
1.3 Compensation Committee Effectiveness
Firms that separate ownership and control create a divergence in the interests
between shareholders and managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Demsetz (1983)
argues that compensation contracts can adequately align the interests of managers with
those of shareholders. Prior studies provide support that compensation committees are
able to alleviate the CEO horizon problem (Cheng 2004; Huson et al., 2012). However,
compensation committees are not equally effective monitors. Uzun et al. (2004) note that
the presence of a compensation committee is positively associated with the likelihood of
fraud. They claim that compensation committees are “systematically dysfunctional” and
responsible for “lucrative stock options” (Uzun et al., 2004).
The monitoring effectiveness of compensation committees is affected by their
characteristics (e.g. Sun and Cahan, 2012; Sun and Cahan, 2009; Sun et al., 2009;
Bebchuk et al., 2010; Collins et al., 2009; Laksmana, 2008; Nelson et al., 2010; Uzun et
al., 2004). Sun and Cahan (2012) argue that six compensation committee characteristics
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affect compensation committee quality: the proportion of co-opted directors, the
proportion of senior directors, the proportion of directors who are CEOs of other
companies, the proportion of directors with block shareholdings in the company, the
proportion of directors who have three or more board seats, and the size of the
compensation committee. They conduct a principal components analysis of these six
characteristics and develop a compensation committee quality measure. They show that
their compensation committee quality measure is negatively associated with CEO tenure,
institutional holdings, growth opportunities, and firm size. Two other studies (Sun et al.,
2009; Sun and Cahan, 2009) use the same measure of compensation committee quality to
examine whether the compensation committee quality affects the pay-for-performance.
Sun et al. (2009) investigate a sample of 474 firms with compensation committees
composed solely of independent directors in 2001, when compensation committee
independence was not a mandatory requirement. They suggest that a compensation
committee’s quality has a positive effect on the relationship between a CEO’s stock
option grants and the firm’s future performance, measured as future operating
performance and future stock returns. They also separately examine the effect of the six
compensation committee characteristics on the pay-for-performance sensitivity. They
find consistent evidence that the proportion of co-opted directors, senior directors, CEO
directors, and busy directors affect the pay-for-performance, but find weak evidence for
director shareholdings and size of the committee. Sun and Cahan (2009) show that the
relationship between CEO cash compensation and accounting earnings increase as a
compensation committee’s quality increases. Moreover, the effect of a compensation
committee is less positive in firms with high growth or incurring losses, which is
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consistent with the idea that high growth firms and loss-bearing firms rely on other
performance measures than accounting earnings. The findings of those two studies
suggest that high-quality compensation committees can design better compensation
packages that align a CEO’s incentives with the firm’s economic benefits.
Bebchuk et al. (2010) examine the association between corporate governance and
the timing of CEO stock options. They document that a compensation committee consists
of independent directors and at least one blockholder who is less likely to grant CEO
options opportunistically at the lowest price of the month. Similarly, Collins et al. (2009)
document a negative association between the likelihood of backdating CEO stock option
grants and having an outsider who owns at least five percent of outstanding shares on the
compensation committee.
Several studies also claim that compensation committee characteristics to relate to
the disclosure transparency of executive compensation (Laksmana, 2008; Nelson et al.,
2010). Managers are generally inclined to avoid the scrutiny from shareholders and
therefore reluctant to disclose their compensation, while better corporate governance
leads to more disclosures. Laksmana (2008) suggests that disclosure transparency of
compensation practices is positively associated with compensation committee
independence, meeting frequency, and size. Using Australian data, Nelson et al. (2010)
find that firms with more independent and effective compensation committees are more
likely to disclose sensitive information related to executive stock options. They also use a
principal components analysis to reduce three compensation committee characteristics,
including committee size, number of committee meetings, and proportion of independent
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directors on the committee, into one factor to proxy for compensation committee
independence and effectiveness.
A growing body of literature has examined whether the independent status of
compensation committee directors affects how effective the compensation committee
protects shareholders from excessive CEO pay (Daily et al., 1998; Chhaochharia and
Grinstein, 2009; Sapp, 2008; Conyon, 2006; Anderson and Bizjak, 2003; Vafeas, 2003b;
Conyon and Peck, 1998; Newman and Mozes, 1999). Despite the general belief that
better governance can oversee CEOs’ rent extraction more effectively, the literature finds
little evidence that a more independent compensation committee leads to lower CEO
compensation. Daily et al. (1998) investigate whether a compensation committee with a
higher proportion of “captured directors” tends to increase CEO pay and CEO noncontingent pay. To define a director as being “captured,” Daily et al. (1998) uses three
measures: whether the director is affiliated with the CEO of the firm, whether the director
is appointed during the tenure of an incumbent CEO, and whether the director is a CEO
of another company. They find no significant association between CEO pay and the
proportion of affiliated directors, or the proportion of CEO directors on the compensation
committee. Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) examine the change in CEO
compensation when firms make changes to the composition of their boards of directors in
compliance with a list of board requirements set by the SEC in 2002. They find no
evidence that the requirements imposed on independent compensation committees are
associated with a reduction in CEO compensation, although they document a negative
association between the requirement which states that the majority of the board of
directors must be independent and the change of CEO compensation. This infers that the
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board’s independence is more important than the compensation committee’s
independence when determining CEO compensation.
Conyon (2006) shows that CEO pay is not affected by the presence of affiliated
directors on compensation committees. He uses the Investor Responsibility Research
Center (IRRC) database and defines directors as “affiliated” if they are either “Employee”
or “Linked.” According to IRRC, a linked director is “is linked to the company through
certain relationships, and whose views may be affected because of such links” (IRRC),
for example a former employee. Similarly, Newman and Mozes (1999) classify inside
directors as former employees of the focal firm, employees of a firm who have the focal
firm’s CEO on their board of directors, current employees of a firm conducting material
business with the focal firm, or interlocking directors. Using data from 1992, they
conclude that CEO pay is not higher in firms with compensation committees that include
insiders, than those whose compensation committees are composed solely of outsiders.
Anderson and Bizjak (2003) classify directors who are not current or formal employees,
are not immediate family members, or who have no business ties with the firm as outside
directors. They find little evidence that CEO pay is higher when the percentage of outside
directors on a compensation committee is lower, or when the CEOs are members of their
compensation committee. Vafeas (2003b) defines insiders as directors who are or were
firm executives or employees of subsidiaries. He finds no evidence among a sample of
271 firms from 1991 to 1997 that CEO pay is related to the presence or percentage of
insiders on the compensation committee.
Two studies find a positive association between compensation committee
independence and CEO compensation. In a sample of Canadian firms, Sapp (2008) finds
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that the number of independent directors on a compensation committee is positively
associated with CEO pay, which is contrary to his prediction. The author argues that this
finding may be due to the definition of “independence.” He also finds that a higher
proportion of directors who are CEOs of other companies and a lower proportion of
financial experts leads to higher CEO compensation. In their sample of U.K. companies,
Conyon and Peck (1998) also document an unanticipated positive association between
the proportion of nonexecutive directors on the remuneration committee and management
pay.
Some of the above-mentioned studies (Anderson and Bizjak, 2003; Newman and
Mozes, 1999; Vafeas, 2003b) and a number of other studies (Capezio et al., 2011;
Conyon and Peck, 1998) have addressed whether compensation committee independence
affects CEO pay-for-performance. Capezio et al. (2011) examine a sample of Australian
companies and find no evidence that a compensation committee dominated by nonexecutive directors improves CEO pay-for-performance. Anderson and Bizjak (2003)
find only marginal evidence that the proportion of outside directors on a compensation
committee is positively related to CEO equity-based pay; they also find no evidence that
the pay mix or pay-for-performance in firms with a compensation committee composed
only of outsiders is different than those with a less independent compensation committee.
Overall, they do not provide strong support that the proportion of outsiders in a
compensation committee increases CEO incentives. Newman and Mozes (1999) find no
significant difference between the pay-for-performance in firms with compensation
committees that have no insiders, and firms with compensation committees with insiders
when the firm’s return is positive. However, they find a significant difference when the
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firm’s return is negative, although the pay is not related to performance, despite whether
compensation committees consist of insiders or not. Their findings suggest that
compensation committees with insiders reward CEOs for a favorable performance the
same way a compensation committees with no insiders would, but those with insiders are
more likely to shield CEO compensation from unfavorable performance. In addition,
Conyon and Peck (1998) show that the pay-for-performance is greater in firms with
remuneration committees with a higher proportion of nonexecutive directors. Vafeas
(2003b) provides evidence that before the compensation disclosure rules of the SEC in
1992, insider participation in compensation committees led to more non-contingent pay,
but less contingent pay and thus less risk for CEOs.
Extant research about compensation committees’ independence reflects, to some
degree, the public’s concern that insider participation in compensation committees may
compromise its independence and may lead to an excessive compensation package that
CEO’s do not deserve. Also motivated by the public’s concern, regulations have become
stricter regarding compensation committees’ degree of independence over the years. In
1992, the SEC adopted provisions to encourage directors without ties to the firm to be
more responsible for establishing executive pay by increasing disclosure requirements
when corporate insiders serve on compensation committees. The 1993 congressional tax
code stipulates that compensation committees must be composed solely of two or more
outside directors, or any performance-based executive pay in excess of $1 million is not
tax deductible. Approved in 2003, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and NASDAQ
require listed firms’ compensation committees to consist solely of independent directors.
According to NYSE section 303A, an independent director is defined as a director with
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no material relationship with the listed company, directly, or as a partner, shareholder, or
officer of an organization that has a relationship with the company. In addition, NYSE
section 303A specifically states that a director is not independent if within three years,
the director has been an employee, an executive officer, or an immediate family member
of the executive officer within the last three years; if the director or his/her family has
received more than $120,000 direct compensation, except for directorship or prior service
in the firm; if the director or his/her family has been an executive officer of another
company in which any current executive officers serve or served on the focal company’s
compensation committee; and, if the director is a current employee or family member of
the current executive officer of a company that does business with the focal company at
an amount exceeding $1 million, or 2% of the company’s consolidated gross revenues.
The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 requires each member of a compensation committee in a
public company to be independent if: the compensation committee member’s source of
compensation is received from the company, or the compensation committee member is
affiliated with the company or its subsidiary.
However, the literature has not determined conclusively whether a compensation
committee’s independence affects CEO pay or pay-for-performance. One explanation for
the mixed findings may be because it is hard to measure the real independence of a
compensation committee. According to Hermanson et al. (2012), many compensation
committee directors interviewed had previous professional or personal connections to
CEOs at the time they were appointed; however, they are independent if judged by the
stock exchange listing standards. Likewise, Bebchuk et al. (2005) allege that even
directors who satisfy the legal requirement for independence may not truly be

19

independent, because the CEO controls the director nomination process and maintains
social relations with directors. O’Reilly and Main (2007) point out two important social
psychological effects: reciprocity and social influence. Under reciprocity, directors may
feel obligated to the CEO if they believe they get their board seats, to some degree,
thanks to the CEO. Under social influence, directors sympathize with the CEO, especially
if they share more similarities with the CEO. They provide empirical evidence that the
board of directors is more prone to reciprocity and social influence tends to be more
generous on CEO pay decisions.
1.4 Co-opted Directors
Coles et al. (2014) argue that directors appointed during the tenure of an
incumbent CEO (i.e., co-opted directors) are less independent. Consistent with their
predictions, they find that the proportion of co-opted directors on the board of directors is
negatively associated with turnover-to-performance sensitivity, and positively associated
with CEO pay and investment, after controlling for the proportion of outsiders on the
board. Their findings infer that co-opted directors are more sympathetic to CEOs, as
evidenced by their tendency to keep CEOs who have performed poorly, to be generous
about CEO pay, and to agree to CEOs’ over-investment. They also argue that non-coopted independence can better explain the independent status of the board, which is the
proportion of directors who are outsiders and appointed before the CEO assumes office.
They document that non-co-opted-independence increases CEO turnover-to-performance
and pay-for-performance, while decreasing CEO pay and investment.
Similarly, Lambert et al. (1993) find that the percentage of outside board
members appointed by the CEO increases the level of executive compensation; they
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investigate the confidential compensation data at different organization levels, including
plant manager, divisional CEO, group CEO, and corporate CEO. Core et al. (1999) also
find a positive association between CEO compensation and the percentage of outside
directors who are appointed after the CEO takes office, indicating that CEOs’
involvement in the nomination of new directors increases their own pay.
Wade et al. (1990) and Collins et al. (2009) reveal a lack of dependence among
co-opted directors. They find that as the percentage of directors appointed during an
incumbent CEO’s tenure on the board increases, the CEO is more likely to be granted a
golden parachute, indicating that CEOs have more influence over the board concerning
their compensation package if the board is composed of more co-opted directors. Collins
et al. (2009) find that a higher proportion of co-opted directors on the board increases the
probability of backdating CEO stock option grants.
Prior studies focus on the boards’ co-options, while only one study (Daily et al.,
1998) examines the compensation committee co-option and provides rather weak
evidence that the compensation committee co-option increases CEO compensation. Daily
et al. (1998) find a positive association between the proportion of co-opted directors on
the compensation committee and CEO total pay and non-contingent pay in one of three
years for their sample from 1992 to 1994.
Two underlying reasons may have contributed to the findings of the above studies.
First, CEOs exert considerable influence on the director nomination process. It has been
criticized that directors are selected by the very CEOs whom they are supposed to
monitor. CEOs propose the slate of directors, and the slate is almost always voted in by
the shareholders (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998). Cai et al. (2009) also show that the

21

differences in shareholders’ votes for directors are small. DeAngelo et al. (1989)
document that even when shareholders disagree with CEOs in a proxy fight, the odds for
shareholders to win the board seat are only about one-third. Mace (1971) interviewed
CEOs and directors, and found that CEOs exert considerable influence on the director
nomination process. With power over the nomination of new directors, CEOs can
negotiate more favorable compensation contracts. For example, Grinstein and Hribar
(2004) document that CEOs receive a higher mergers and acquisitions (M&As) bonus
when they sit on the nomination committee, and when they are also the board chair.
After the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, a CEO’s direct involvement in the director
nomination process has significantly reduced. For example, NYSE Corporate
Governance, section 303A, which was approved on June 30, 2003, requires listed
companies to have a nominating committee composed entirely of independent directors.
A CEO can still exert informal or indirect influence over the nomination, however.
NASDAQ Rule 4350 (c), and AMEX Enhanced Corporate Governance Rules, section
805, have similar requirements. However, CEOs can still exert indirect influence on the
appointment of directors.
Studies focusing on CEOs’ influence in the director nomination process suggest
that CEOs favor directors who are sympathetic (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1989), who
are similar to themselves (Westphal and Zajac, 1995; Hwang and Kim, 2009) or who are
gray directors (Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999) to gain more board support. Finkelstein
and Hambrick (1989) allege that the longer a CEO stays in a company, then he or she
may appoint more sympathetic directors to the board of directors. Westphal and Zajac
(1995) allege that CEOs prefer directors who share a similar functional background, age,
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education level, and outsider/insider status, since those directors are less likely to
disagree with CEOs. They consider the director nomination process to be a power battle
between CEOs and the existing board, in which more CEO power leads to the
appointment of directors who are more similar demographically to the CEO. Meanwhile,
directors who are more similar to the board will be appointed if the board is more
powerful relative to the CEO. Their findings generally support their predictions. They
also find that the change in the similarity between the CEO and the board is positively
associated with the change in a CEO’s total compensation; it is negatively associated
with the change in a CEO’s contingent compensation, indicating that by appointing a
more similar director, CEOs may increase their total pay while decreasing their exposure
to risk. Similarly, Hwang and Kim (2009) find evidence that the number of socially
linked directors increases as a new CEO’s tenure at the firm progresses, suggesting that
CEOs select directors who share similar ideas and views, or who have certain social ties
to the CEO. O'Reilly et al. (1988) observe a significant association between the salary
levels of compensation committee directors and CEO compensation. They suggest that
CEOs may select directors who are highly paid current or retired CEOs of other
companies so that those directors use their own compensation as a reference when they
determine CEO compensation. But they fail to establish the causality because they do not
have the data for the director’s appointment date.
Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) reveal that when a CEO serves on the nomination
committee or there is no separate nomination committee, companies appoint a higher
number of gray directors and fewer independent directors. Their results indicate that
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when CEOs are involved in the director nomination, they select directors more subjective
to their control.
The second reason why co-opted directors are less independent is because they
may feel as if they owe their board seats to the CEO (Dailey et al., 1998); they are likely
to offer their gratitude by biasing for the CEO (Bebchuk et al., 2002; Bebchuk et al.,
2005). In other words, co-opted compensation committee directors may put CEO interest
over their fiduciary responsibility to shareholders.

2. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Prior studies investigating firms’ CEO horizon problem focus on two
opportunistic behaviors that CEOs exhibit to maximize their earnings-based
compensation. The first is opportunistic R&D reduction, and the second is opportunistic
accruals management. Although career concerns mitigate a firm’s CEO horizon problem
early in the CEO’s career, career concerns may be subjected to the CEO horizon problem
when CEOs approach retirement. To alleviate this horizon problem, compensation
committees can take an active role to adjust CEO compensation to induce the right
incentives.
Literature examining the association between CEO compensation and the
components of earnings suggest that compensation committees intervene to adjust CEO
compensation. For example, according to Cheng (2004), a positive association between
change in R&D expenditures and change in CEO compensation suggests that
compensation committees reward investment in R&D and punish opportunistic reduction
in R&D expenditures. He finds no association between CEO compensation and R&D
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expenditures, which is consistent with prior literature that R&D expenditures are
generally shielded from CEO compensation. However, he finds a positive association
between change in R&D expenditures and change in CEO stock option compensation
when CEOs approach retirement, which suggests that compensation committees penalize
CEOs for opportunistic R&D reduction in a CEO’s final years before retirement. Using a
sample of 476 firms in which CEOs retired or departed voluntarily, Huson et al. (2012)
investigated the effect of the horizon problem on the association between positive change
in discretionary accruals and CEO cash compensation. They document that the relative
weight of positive change in discretionary accruals reduces significantly in the year of
CEO turnover, and in the year before. They suggest that although an increase in
discretionary accruals is treated the same way as other earnings components in CEOs’
non-terminal years, the increase receives less weight compared to other earnings
components when CEOs are in their terminal years. This indicates that compensation
committees restrain CEOs from opportunistic income-increasing accruals management
prior to CEO departures. To some degree, these studies are in line with the optimal
contracting theory that compensation contracts are optimally designed to motivate the
managers to act in the best interests of shareholders (Holmstrom, 1979). However, this
literature reveals the roles of compensation committees in mitigating horizon problems
without investigating compensation committees directly.
The effectiveness of compensation committees can be different between firms.
Cheng (2004) separately investigates firms with opportunistic R&D reductions when
CEOs approach retirement, and firms without such reductions. He only finds a significant
association between changes in CEO stock option grants and changes in R&D

25

expenditures in firms without opportunistic R&D reductions, but not in other firms. This
brings up the question: why do some firms successfully adjust CEO compensation and
thus mitigate horizon problems, while others don’t? For one thing, firms’ different
reactions to CEO horizon problem may be due to the different degree of co-option among
compensation committees.
Under the managerial power theory, because managers use their influence to
extract rents from the board of directors, compensation contracts always deviate from the
optimum (Finkelstein, 1992). In other words, to control the compensation contracting
process, CEOs need agreeable or loyal directors on the board of directors. Therefore, they
tend to appoint directors who are sympathetic. These co-opted directors feel obligated to
their CEOs and as a result make decisions favorable to the CEOs. In a recent study, Coles
et al. (2014) provide empirical evidence that board co-option decreases monitoring
effectiveness. They document that CEO pay and investment are positively related to
board co-option, while CEO turnover to performance sensitivity is negatively related to
board co-option. They further suggest that the proportion of co-opted directors who are
outsiders increases CEO pay, while the proportion of co-opted directors who are insiders
is not related to CEO pay or CEO pay-for-performance, inferring that even outside
directors’ independence, if co-opted by CEOs, are damaged. Furthermore, they propose
that the proportion of outsiders who are not co-opted by CEOs is a more ‘incisive’
measure for board monitoring because it increases CEO turnover to performance
sensitivity, and to pay-for-performance sensitivity, while reducing CEO pay and
investment. Their findings are consistent with the managerial power theory, which states
that CEOs use their power to gain control over the board. Social and psychological
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factors keep directors from real independence. Directors who are co-opted by the
incumbent CEO may feel obligated to the CEO, and as a result, are less willing to
challenge the CEO.
Coles et al. (2014) examine entire boards of directors. It is not clear that the
increased CEO pay and reduced CEO pay-for-performance is driven by the co-option of
compensation committees or the co-option of the board. Similarly, Lambert et al. (1993),
Wade et al. (1990), and Collins et al. (2009) also focus on the co-option of the board.
Daily et al. (1998) examine the co-option of compensation committees. However, they
document little empirical evidence that the co-option of compensation committees is
positively associated with CEO non-contingent pay in 1992, but no evidence for 1993 or
1994. They find no association between the co-option of compensation committees and
CEO contingent pay or CEO total pay.
Excessive CEO payment has been under fire. Since the authority to set CEO
compensation is delegated to compensation committees, if co-option decreases the
monitoring effectiveness of the compensation committee, then the co-option may
increase CEO compensation. Therefore, I predict:
H1: CEO compensation is positively associated with the co-option of
compensation committees.
Prior literature examining the CEO horizon problem found mixed evidence of
opportunistic R&D reductions and opportunistic accruals management. One explanation
for the lack of consistent evidence in support of the CEO horizon problem may be due to
the intervention of compensation committees. Effective compensation committees should
predict CEO horizon problem and mitigate CEOs’ opportunistic behavior. However, if
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compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors are less effective monitors,
they are less likely to alleviate CEO opportunistic behaviors. Therefore, I predict:
H2a: R&D expenditures are negatively associated with the CEO horizon
problem when compensation committees are dominated by co-opted
directors.
H2b: Discretionary accruals are positively associated with the CEO
horizon problem when compensation committees are dominated by coopted directors.
CEOs’ compensation packages are an important means of resolving the conflict
between shareholders and the CEO (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978?). For example,
compensation packages can be used to prevent a CEO’s opportunistic behaviors. If R&D
expenditures are shielded from CEO compensation, CEOs’ incentives to cut R&D
expenditures will be alleviated. Cheng (2004) finds a positive association between change
in R&D and change in CEO stock options when a firm is confronted with a CEO horizon
problem, indicating that compensation committees reward R&D investment and punish
R&D reduction when CEOs have incentives to act opportunistically. According to
interviews conducted by Hermanson et al. (2012), compensation committees
communicate with CEOs about their compensation packages. CEOs who are aware that
R&D expenditures are shielded or rewarded should refrain from opportunistic R&D
cutting. Compensation committees who are aligned with shareholders’ best interests are
more likely to predict CEO horizon problem and adjust CEO compensation accordingly.
Therefore, effective compensation committees should shield or reward an increase in
R&D in a CEO’s final years before his or her retirement, to mitigate the CEO horizon
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problem. However, compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors may be
less responsive to the CEO horizon problem or less willing to punish CEOs for R&D
reduction. As a result, R&D expenditures are less shielded from CEO compensation, or
R&D reduction is punished less severely, so that as CEOs reduce R&D expenditures,
their compensation increases. Therefore, I predict:
H3a: Changes in CEO compensation are more negatively associated with
changes in R&D expenditures when firms have a CEO horizon
problem and compensation committees are dominated by the co-opted
directors.
The CEO horizon problem is also alleviated if income-increasing discretionary
accruals are weighted less when deciding CEO compensation. Effective compensation
may reduce the association between CEO compensation and income-increasing
discretionary accruals when firms are faced with the CEO horizon problem. However,
compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors may be less effective in
adjusting the association between CEO compensation and income-increasing
discretionary accruals in the final years before CEO retirement, and as a result, when
CEOs are involved in income-increasing accruals management, their compensation
increases. Therefore, I predict:
H3b: Changes in CEO compensation are more positively associated
with income-increasing discretionary accruals when firms are
confronted with the CEO horizon problem and compensation
committees are dominated by the co-opted directors.
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3. RESEARCH DESIGN
3.1 Variable Construction
Compensation Committee Co-option
Following Coles et al. (2014), I measure co-option CC_COOPTION as the
percentage of co-opted directors on the compensation committee. The effect of co-opted
directors on CEO compensation decisions may not be linear. Therefore, I define co-opted
directors as directors appointed after the incumbent CEO takes office. I define
compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors COOPTED_CC as a dummy
variable that equals one if the majority of directors on the compensation committee are
co-opted directors, and zero otherwise.
Horizon Problem
I follow Kalyta (2009) and define Horizon as a dummy variable that equals one if
CEOs are in any of the final two years prior to their retirement, and zero otherwise. The
first reason I focus on CEO retirement rather than on CEO turnovers is because retiring
CEOs have more severe horizon problems since they are less concerned with their
reputation on the labor market (Gibbons and Murphy, 1992). Also, minus unplanned
CEO turnover, CEOs can plan their retirement. Most companies have a specified
retirement age (Sundaram and Yermack, 2007) 2 . CEOs who are able to predict their
departures have more chances to cut R&D or manage accruals (Dechow and Sloan, 1991).
I first identify CEO turnovers, and then remove the CEOs who leave their firm at an age
2

Sundaram and Yermack (2007) suggest that companies expect CEOs to retire at the specified
age. If CEOs leave early, they will not obtain the full value of the pension benefit. If CEOs stay
beyond the specified retirement age, they forfeit the right to pension benefits that would
otherwise have been collected by retiring.
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younger than 63, consistent with Kalyta (2009). RiskMetrics identifies the reason for
CEO departures, although this information is missing for most firms. Out of 303
retirements identified by RiskMetrics, the retirement age ranges from 46 to 82. The
average retirement age is 64.6, and the median is 64.5. 77 CEOs retired at 64, 61 CEOs
retired at 65, 55 CEOs retired at 60, and 52 CEOs retired at 63. I also assume the
retirement age as 60, 61, and 62, and the results are similar. I also impose another
criterion that a retired CEO must have held the position for more than three full years to
eliminate the potential effect of the horizon problem associated with the departure of the
previous CEO, similar to prior studies (Kalyta, 2009; Huson et al., 2012). The predeparture years are two years before CEO retirement in this study.

CEO compensation
Total CEO compensation is defined as the sum of a CEO’s salary, bonus, other
annual compensation, restricted stock grants, long-term incentive payouts, all other
compensation, and value of option grants (EXECUCOMP data item TDC1). CEO cash
compensation includes salary and a bonus. CEO long-term compensation is measured as
the sum of restricted stock grants, value of option grants, and long-term incentive payouts.
I use the natural logarithm of all the compensation measures to reduce heteroskedasticity,
similar to prior studies (Cheng, 2004; Huson et al., 2012).

I also adjust all the

compensation measures to 2003 dollars, using the Consumer Price Index. My findings are
robust without the adjustment.
I examine cash compensation, total compensation, and long-term compensation
separately, because compensation committees may use different compensation
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components to mitigate opportunistic R&D curtailment and accruals management.
Dechow and Sloan (1991) show that equity-based compensation can be used to alleviate
R&D reduction. Cheng (2004) documents that compensation committees adjust CEO
stock options that are vested in future years when R&D investments benefit the firm.
They suggest stock options are used rather than cash compensation to guarantee the
quality of R&D investments. However, Huson et al. (2012) provide evidence that
compensation committees adjust CEO cash compensation to prevent accruals
management. They do not test long-term based compensation; nevertheless, they claim
that most of CEO supplemental employee retirement plans (SERPs) are based on CEO
cash compensation during CEOs’ final years before retirement, and Kalyta (2009) only
finds accruals management in firms with a retiring CEO whose SERP depends on firm
performance.
Discretionary accruals
I measure discretionary accruals using the forward-looking discretionary accruals
model developed by Dechow et al. (2003). Specifically, I define total accruals TAi,t as the
difference between earnings before extraordinary items and cash flows from operations,
scaled by total assets at the beginning of year t. I then estimate the following model
cross-sectionally by industry3 and year.
TAi,t = α + β1((1 + k) ΔSALEi,t- ΔRECi,t) + β2PPEi,t + β3 Ai,t-1 +
β4GR_SALEi,t + εi,t

3

(1a)

Industry is defined by two-digit SIC code.
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Where k4 is the slope coefficient from the regression of change in accounts receivable on
change in sales for each industry and year group, and captures the expected change in
accounts receivable for a given change in sales. ΔSALEi,t is the change in sales from the
year t-1 to the year t scaled by total assets at t-1, ΔRECi,t is the change in net receivables
from the year t-1 to year t scaled by total assets at t-1, PPEi,t is the gross property plants
and equipment in year t scaled by total assets at t-1, Ai,t-1 is total assets at the beginning of
year t, and GR_SALEi,t-1 is the sales growth from year t to year t+1.
Nondiscretionary accruals for each firm-year observation are calculated by
applying industry and year-specific parameters β1, β2, and β3 as follows:
NDAi,t = α + β1((1 + k) ΔSALEi,t- ΔRECi,t) + β2PPEi,t + β3 Ai,t-1 +
β4GR_SALEi,t

(1b)

Discretionary accruals are then estimated by subtracting the predicted level of
nondiscretionary accruals (NDA) from total accruals (TA), as follows:
Discretionary accrualsi,t = TAi,t – NDAi,t

(1c)

3.2 Empirical Model and Control Variables
Hypothesis H1 predicts that CEO compensation is higher if the compensation
committee is dominated by co-opted directors. Moreover, a CEO is more likely to enjoy
increased compensation in the final years before retirement if the compensation
committee is dominated by co-opted directors. To test H1, I run the model (2), as
specified below:
lnCEO_PAYi,t = α + β1COOPTED_CCi,t + β2SIZEi,t + β3ROAi,t +
β4CEO_TENUREi,t + β5CEO_OWNERSHIPi,t +
4

K is restricted to be between 0 and 1, following Dechow et al. (2003).
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β6CEO_CHAIRi,t + β7B_INDEPENDENCEi,t + β8B_SIZEi,t +
β9B_FEMALEi,t + G_INDEX + YEAR + εi,t

(2)

Where COOPTED_CC is an indicator variable that equals one if the majority of
compensation committee directors are co-opted by the incumbent CEO, and zero
otherwise. Hypothesis H1 predicts the coefficient β1 to be positive and significant.
My control variables are similar to Coles et al. (2014). SIZE is the natural
logarithm of sales, RET is the firm’s stock return, ROA is the earnings before
extraordinary item divided by total assets, CEO_TENURE is the CEO tenure,
CEO_OWNERSHIP is the proportion of outstanding shares held by the CEO,
CEO_CHAIR is an indicator variable that equals one if the CEO is the chairman of the
board of directors, and zero otherwise, B_INDEPENDENCE is the proportion of
outsiders on the board of directors, B_OWNERSHIP is the total shares held by directors
on a board, divided by total outstanding shares, B_SIZE is the number of directors on
board, B_FEMALE is an indicator that equals one if at least one of the directors on board
is female, and zero otherwise, and G_INDEX is the governance index described by
Gompers et al. (2003), which states that G1 equals one if G < = 6, and zero otherwise; G2
equals one if 7 < = G < = 9, and zero otherwise; G3 equals one if 10 < = G < = 12, and
zero otherwise; G4 equals one if G > = 13, and zero otherwise. I also control year fixed
effect (YEAR).
Consistent with prior literature, I expect that CEO compensation positively
associates with firm size (SIZE), as CEOs of larger firms add more value (Smith and
Watts, 1992), and better firm performance, as measured by RET and ROA (Murphy, 1985;
Smith and Watts, 1992). Core et al. (1999) show that CEO compensation positively
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relates to CEO_CHAIR, B_SIZE, and negatively relates to CEO_OWNERSHIP, as weak
governance tends to increase CEO compensation. I do not predict the sign for
B_OWNERSHIP and B_INDEPENDENCE because Core et al. (1999) find an
insignificant association between CEO compensation and B_OWNERSHIP, and a
negative association between CEO compensation and the proportion of insiders on the
board of directors, which is contrary to their prediction. Adams and Ferreira (2009)
suggest that female directors impact board decisions as well. I expect that CEO
compensation varies with the B_FEMALE, but I do not predict the sign for the
association. Hill and Phan (1991) suggest that the CEO’s control over the board of
directors and internal information system increase as CEO tenure increases. They find
that as CEO tenure grows, CEO pay is more related to firm size and firm risk, but less
related to firm performance, which indicates CEOs with longer tenure are more capable
to influence their compensation packages. Drawing from their findings, I predict a
positive relationship between CEO compensation and CEO tenure.
I rely on the model of Cazier (2011) to test Hypothesis H2a. Cazier (2011) finds
no evidence that R&D spending is related to the CEO horizon problem, and concludes
that CEOs do not cut R&D spending in their final years prior to retirement. However, he
fails to take into account the role of the compensation committee in mitigating CEO
opportunistic R&D cutting. H2a predicts that R&D spending may negatively associate
with the CEO horizon problem if the compensation committee is dominated by co-opted
directors, who are less effective monitors. I test H2a by estimating model (3) as follows:
RDi,t = α + β1HORIZONi,t + β2COOPTED_CCi,t + β3HORIZONi,t
×COOPTED_CCi,t + β4TOBINS_Qi,t + β5LAG_RETi,t + β6FCFi,t +

35

β7ROAi,t + β8SIZEi,t + β9FIRM_AGEi,t + β10 EQUITY_INCENTIVESi,t
+ β11INDUSTRY_RDi,t + YEAR + εi,t

(3)

Where RD is the R&D expense scaled by total assets, COOPTED_CC is an indicator
variable that equals one if the majority of compensation committee directors are co-opted
by the incumbent CEO, and zero otherwise, and HORIZON is an indicator variable that
equals to one if the CEO is in the final two years before retirement, and zero otherwise.
The interaction term between HORIZON×COOPTED_CC is interpreted as the indicator
variable that equals one if the CEO is approaching retirement and the compensation
committee is dominated by co-opted directors. According to H2a, the coefficient β3
should be significantly negative, which indicates that R&D reduction is expected only
when compensation committees fail to mitigate CEO opportunistic behaviors.
I also control for other variables that may affect R&D expenditures and relate to
the CEO horizon problem and compensation committee co-option, which are similar to
Cazier (2011). TOBINS_Q is calculated as the market value of equity plus the book value
of debt, all scaled by total assets, LAG_RET is the firm’s stock return from the previous
year, FCF is the operating cash flows plus R&D expense minus capital expenditures, all
scaled by sales, ROA is operating net income before R&D expense scaled by assets, SIZE
is the natural logarithm of total assets at the beginning of fiscal year t, FIRM_AGE is the
number of years between year t and the first year the company was listed on Compustat.
EQUITY_INCENTIVES is the CEO's dollar wealth increase from a one percent change in
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stock price, as measured in Core and Guay’s study (2002) 5 . INDUSTRY_RD is the
average R&D expenditure of other firms in the same two-digit SIC industry.
I predict the coefficient on TOBINS_Q and LAG_RET to be positive, since firms
with more growth opportunities may invest more in R&D. Consistent with Himmelberg
and Petersen (1994), I predict that R&D expenditures positively associate with internal
finance, which is measured by the firm’s free cash flow (FCF). I predict that R&D
expenditures negatively relate to the accounting flexibility, as measured by ROA, since
Wang and D’Souza (2006) suggest that when accounting flexibility is low, managers are
more likely to engage in real earnings management. I expect that R&D spending varies
with firm size. Cohen and Klepper (1996) suggest that larger firms can apply R&D
results to greater output and therefore reduce the average cost of R&D. Based on the
findings of Huergo and Jaumandreu (2004), I predict that firm age (FIRM_AGE)
negatively associates with R&D expenditures, since older firms are less likely to
introduce innovations. CEOs with more equity holdings are more long-term oriented and
willing to spend in R&D, although R&D expenditures reduce current earnings (Barker
and Mueller, 2002). Therefore, I predict the coefficient on EQUITY_INCENTIVES to be
positive. Consistent with prior studies (Dechow and Sloan, 1991; Cheng, 2004), I also
control for the industry average R&D expenditures. I exclude each firm-year from the
calculation of the industry average R&D to prevent a mechanical relation between RD
and INDUSTRY_RD.

5

I calculate EQUITY_INCENTIVES as 1% × the firm’s share price × (# of shares + # of options × option
delta). I follow Core and Guay (2002) methodology to calculate option delta separately for newly granted
options, unexercisable options, and exercisable options before the year of 2006. After the passage of SFAS
123R, Execucomp stops providing the inputs necessary to calculate Black-Scholes value of option delta. I
follow Execucomp assumptions to construct self-calculated inputs.
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To test hypothesis H2b, I run the following model (4) cross-sectionally:
DAi,t = α + β1HORIZONi,t + β2COOPTED_CCi,t + β3HORIZONi,t
×CO_OPTED_CCi,t + β4EQUITY_INCENTIVESi,t + β5SIZEi,t +
β6STD_CASHFLOWi,t + β7STD_REVi,t + β8STD_SALESGROWTHi,t +
β9OLDFIRMi,t + β10LEVERAGEi,t + β11MARKETTOBOOKi,t +
G_INDEX + EXCHANGE + INDUSTRY + YEAR + εi,t

(4)

Hypothesis H2b predicts the coefficient β3 on the interaction term between
HORIZON×COOPTED_CC to be significantly positive, if CEOs have incentive to
engage in accruals management to boost their earnings-based compensation, and if
compensation committees dominated by co-opted director fail to mitigate their incentives.
DA is the discretionary accruals derived from the equation (1c).
My control variables are similar to Bergstresser and Philippon (2006). I control
for CEO equity incentive, as CEOs have more incentive to manage earnings when their
wealth is more sensitive to the firms’ share price (Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006). I
follow Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) to measure CEO equity incentives.
EQUITY_INCENTIVES is the dollar change in a CEO's wealth from a 1% change in
stock price, as measured in Core and Guay (2002), then normalized by the sum of the
dollar change, salary, and bonus. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets at the
beginning of fiscal year t. STD_CASHFLOW is the standard deviation of cash flows from
operations deflated by total assets over the current and previous four years. STD_REV is
the standard deviation of sales deflated by total assets over the current and previous four
years. STD_SALESGROWTH is the standard deviation of sales growth over the current
and previous four years. OLDFIRM equals one if a firm has been listed on Compustat for
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more than 20 years, and zero otherwise. LEVERAGE is total liabilities deflated by total
assets. MARKETTOBOOK represents deciles of market value of assets divided by the
book value of assets ranked within each year. G_INDEX represents the governance
indicator variables described in Gompers et al. (2003). G1 is a dummy variable equal to
one if the G-score is less than or equal to 6, and zero otherwise. G2 is a dummy variable
equal to one if the G-score is between 7 (inclusive) and 9 (inclusive), and zero otherwise.
G3 is a dummy variable equal to one if the G-score is between 10 (inclusive) and 12
(inclusive), and zero otherwise. G4 is a dummy variable equal to one if the G-score is
greater than or equal to 13, and zero otherwise. EXCHANGE is an indicator for the stock
exchange where the company is traded. INDUSTRY is the Fama and French (1997)
industry classification indicator. YEAR represents year indicators.
I expect firm size (SIZE) to negatively associate with discretionary accruals, since
larger firms are under more scrutiny by analysts and the press (Duellman et al., 2013). I
expect that discretionary accruals vary with firm age (OLDFIRM), the standard deviation
of cash flows from operations (STD_CASHFLOW), the standard deviation of revenues
(STD_REV), the standard deviation of sales growth (STD_SALESGROWTH), and
governance (G_INDEX), consistent with prior literature (Duellman et al., 2013; Jiang et
al., 2010).
To examine whether compensation committee co-option affects the committee’s
effectiveness in adjusting CEO compensation to mitigate the CEO horizon problem, I
estimate the regressions (5) and (6) using control variables consistent with Huson et al.
(2012).
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ΔlnCEO_COMPi,t = α + β1ΔROAi,t + β2ADJ_RETi,t + β3ΔRDi,t +
β4HORIZONi,t + β5COOPTED_CCi,t + β6HORIZONi,t×
ΔROAi,t + β7HORIZONi,t×ADJ_RETi,t + β8HORIZONi,t×
∆RDi,t + β9 HORIZONi,t×COOPTED_CCi,t +
β10COOPTED_CCi,t×∆RDi,t + β
11HORIZONi,t×COOPTED_CCi,t×∆RDi,t

+ YEAR + εi,t
(5)

Where ΔlnCEO_COMP is the change in natural logarithm of CEO compensation6. I use
three measures of CEO compensation: ∆lnC_PAY is the change in the natural logarithm
of CEO salary and bonus. ∆lnT_PAY is the change in the natural logarithm of CEO total
compensation, which includes salary, bonus, other annual compensation, restricted stock
grants, long-term incentive payouts, all other compensation, and value of option grants
(EXECUCOMP data item TDC1). ∆lnL_PAY is the change in natural logarithm of longterm CEO compensation, which is defined as the sum of restricted stock grants, value of
option grants, and long-term incentive payouts. ∆ROA is the change in earnings before
extraordinary items, scaled by lagged total assets. ADJ_RET is the firm’s annual sizeadjusted stock return, which is calculated by subtracting the firm’s return by the market
return for the corresponding market capitalization decile. ∆RD is the change in R&D
expenditures, scaled by lagged total assets. HORIZON is an indicator variable equal to
one if CEOs are in the final two years before retirement, and zero otherwise.
COOPTED_CC is an indicator variable equal to one if the majority of compensation

6

I only calculate the change in compensation for the same CEO.
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committee directors are co-opted by the incumbent CEO, and zero otherwise. YEAR
represents year indicators.
ΔROA and ∆RD are both included to examine the different treatment of ∆RD
compared to other earnings components. If ∆RD is treated the same way as other earnings
components when there is no horizon problem, then the coefficient β3 on ∆RD should be
insignificant, while a significant positive coefficient should indicate shielding of ∆RD
from CEO compensation. The variable of interest is the interaction term between
HORIZON, COOPTED_CC, and ∆RD. H3a predicts that compensation committees
dominated by co-opted directors are less effective in mitigating opportunistic R&D
reduction when CEOs approach retirement. Effective compensation committees can
reduce the negative relationship between R&D expenditure and CEO compensation by
shielding R&D from CEO compensation or tying CEO compensation to R&D.
Nevertheless, compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors are less
effective in adjusting the negative relationship between R&D and CEO compensation.
Therefore, when CEOs reduce R&D spending, they are more likely to increase their
compensation prior to retirement. I expect the coefficient β11 to be negative, if H3a is
correct.
Consistent with prior studies (Murphy, 1985; Smith and Watts, 1992), I expect
CEO compensation to be positively associated with accounting performance (ΔROA) and
stock performance (ADJ_RET). I include the interaction terms HORIZON×ΔROA and
HORIZON×ADJ_RET because Lewellen et al. (1987) suggest the proportion of
accounting-related compensation and stock-related compensation is adjusted to address
CEO horizon problem. I expect the coefficient β6 on HORIZON× ΔROA to be negative

41

and β7 on HORIZON×ADJ_RET to be positive, which indicates CEO compensation shifts
from accounting-based compensation to stock-based compensation to reduce the agency
costs related to the CEO horizon problem. When ∆lnC_PAY is the dependent variable, I
also control for CEO equity incentives (EQUITY_INCENTIVES), as CEO equity holdings
may be one of the factors that compensation committees consider to determine CEO cash
compensation (Huson et al., 2012).
Hypothesis H3b predicts a more positive association between change in CEO
compensation and a positive change in discretionary accruals when a compensation
committee is dominated by co-opted directors. To test H3b, I estimate regression (6) as
follows:
ΔlnCEO_COMPi,t = α + β1ΔROAi,t + β2ADJ_RETi,t + β3POS_∆DAi,t +
β4NEG_∆DAi,t + β5HORIZONi,t + β6COOPTED_CCi,t +
β7HORIZONi,t×ΔROAi,t + β8HORIZONi,t×ADJ_RETi,t +
β9HORIZONi,t×POS_∆DAi,t + β10HORIZONi,t×
NEG_∆DAi,t + β11 HORIZONi,t×COOPTED_CCi,t +
β12COOPTED_CCi,t× POS_∆DAi,t +
β13COOPTED_CCi,t× NEG_∆DAi,t + β
14HORIZONi,t×COOPTED_CCi,t×POS_∆DAi,t

+

β15HORIZONi,t ×COOPTED_CCi,t×NEG_∆DAi,t +
YEAR + εi,t

(6)

Where POS_∆DA is the positive changes in discretionary accruals, and NEG_∆DA is the
negative changes in discretionary accruals. My variable of interest is the interaction term
HORIZON×COOPTED_CC×POS_∆DA. I expect the coefficient to be positive, if H3b is
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correct. My hypothesis only predicts that CEOs have incentives to engage in incomeincreasing accruals management, and compensation committees dominated by co-opted
directors are less effective to mitigate the income-increasing accruals management.
Consequently, I focus on the positive change of discretionary accruals. I test the
interaction term HORIZON×COOPTED_CC×NEG_∆DA for completeness. Nevertheless,
I make no prediction about the sign of its coefficient.

4. RESULTS
4.1 Sample
Table 1 Panel A presents the sample selection procedure. I collect director data
from RiskMetrics for the period from 1998 to 2011. RiskMetrics provides director
information, including committee membership, shareholding, age, independence,
additional directorships, and tenure, as well as the year directorship starts for directors in
S&P 500, S&P MidCap, and S&P SmallCap firms. I lose 2,445 firm-year observations as
they lack CEO compensation data from Execucomp. I further lose 479 firm-year
observations which miss the date when the CEO was hired. I exclude 2,788 financial
institutions (SIC codes 6000-6999) similar to prior studies. I exclude another 595
observations that are missing Compustat inputs to calculate sales, return, and ROA, and
352 observations lacking number of shares held by the CEO. Finally, I trim the top and
bottom one percent of all continuous variables to mitigate the effect of outliers. My final
sample consists of 13,606 firm-year observations7.

7

When estimating model (3)-(6), I further remove the firm-year observations with CEO tenure less than 3
years, to avoid the influence of the previous CEO.
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[See Table 1 Panel A, p.72]
In Table 1 Panel B, I present the number of firm-year observations in each of
Fama-French (1997) 48 industries as well as average value of two measures of
compensation committee co-option in each industry. The percentage of co-opted directors
sitting on a compensation committee is 0.278 for the industry of candy and soda, which is
the lowest, while the industry of nonmetallic mines has the highest percentage of coopted directors on a compensation committee, which is as high as 0.649.
[See Table 1 Panel B, p.72]
In Table 1 Panel C, I provide the number of firm-year observations in each fiscal
year for the period of 1998 to 2011 as well as average value of two measures of
compensation committee co-option for each fiscal year. The mean value of the
percentage of co-opted directors on a compensation committee varies by years. The
lowest average value of CC_COOPTION is 0.394 in the year of 2001, while the highest
average value of CC_COOPTION is 0.453 in the year of 2010.
[See Table 1 Panel C, p.72]
Table 1 Panel D displays the descriptive statistics for the variables used in model
(2), and are consistent with the descriptive statistics reported by Coles et al. (2014).
Pearson correlations are reported in Table 1 Panel E.
[See Table 1 Panel D, p.72]
[See Table 1 Panel E, p.72]
4.2 Regression Results
Table 2 presents the multivariate analysis of the effect of compensation
committees dominated by co-opted directors on total CEO compensation. The reported p-
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values presented in parentheses and are one-tailed for coefficients that have the predicted
sign, and two-tailed for those without a predicted sign or those that do not have the
predicted sign. The standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust, and clustered by firm
and year. The coefficient on COOPTED_CC is significantly positive (p<0.01), which
indicates that CEOs receive higher compensation in companies with compensation
committees dominated by co-opted directors, holding all else constant. My findings
support Hypothesis H1.
[See Table 2, p.78]
Among the control variables, firm size, firm performance, and CEO duality are
positively associated with CEO compensation, while director ownership is negatively
associated with CEO compensation, as expected. I do not find CEO tenure or board size
to be associated with CEO compensation.
[See Table 3, p.79]
Panel A and Panel B of Table 3 report the descriptive statistics and Pearson
correlations for the variables used in model (3), respectively. Table 4 reports the
regression analysis of the effect of compensation committees dominated by co-opted
directors on the association between R&D spending and the CEO horizon problem. The
coefficient on HORIZON is not significantly different from zero, which is consistent with
prior studies which state that R&D spending is not related to the CEO horizon problem
(Cazier,

2011).

However,

the

coefficient

on

the

interaction

term

HORIZON×COOPTED_CC is significantly negative (p=0.03). Taken together, the
results indicate that R&D reduction only exists in firms that have a CEO horizon problem
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and a compensation committee dominated by co-opted directors, which is consistent with
Hypothesis H2a.
[See Table 4, p.81]
Panel A and Panel B of Table 5 report the descriptive statistics and Pearson
correlations for the variables used in model (4), respectively. The regression analysis of
the effect of compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors on the
association between discretionary accruals management and the CEO horizon problem is
presented in Table 6. The coefficient on the interaction term HORIZON×COOPTED_CC
is positive and significant (P=0.05). The coefficient on HORIZON is not significantly
different from zero. This suggests that CEOs engage in accruals management only when
the horizon problem exists and when the compensation committee is dominated by coopted directors, which is consistent with Hypothesis H2b.
[See Table 5, p.82]
[See Table 6, p.84]
Panel A and Panel B of Table 7 report the descriptive statistics and Pearson
correlations for the variables used in model (5), respectively. The estimates in Table 8
show the multivariate regression results of whether compensation committees dominated
by co-opted directors are less effective in adjusting CEO compensation to prevent
opportunistic R&D reduction when firms face a CEO horizon problem. The first column
shows the regression results when the change in CEO cash compensation is a dependent
variable, while the results for the change in total CEO compensation and the change in
long-term CEO compensation are presented in column (2) and column (3), respectively.
In column (2), the coefficient on HORIZON×∆RD is significantly positive (p=0.09),
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suggesting that R&D expenditures are generally shielded from total CEO compensation
when

firms

have

a

CEO

horizon

problem.

The

coefficient

on

HORIZON×COOPTED_CC×∆RD is negative and significant (p=0.05). The negative
association suggests that retiring CEOs in firms with a compensation committee
dominated by co-opted directors are more likely to increase their compensation by
reducing R&D expenditures.
[See Table 7, p.85]
[See Table 8, p.87]
In Table 9, I present the OLS regression results of whether compensation
committees dominated by co-opted directors are less effective in adjusting CEO
compensation in the final years prior to CEO retirement to prevent income-increasing
accruals management. The coefficients on HORIZON×POS_∆DA are not significantly
different

from

zero

in

all

three

columns.

The

coefficient

on

HORIZON×COOPTED_CC×POS_∆DA is positive and significant (p=0.08) in column
(1), indicating that change in CEO cash compensation is more positively associated with
income-increasing discretionary accruals when CEOs present a horizon problem and
compensation committees are dominated by co-opted directors.
[See Table 9, p.88]
Overall, my findings provide empirical support for Hypothesis H3a and
Hypothesis H3.
4.3 Sensitivity Tests
As CEOs stay longer with a firm, more directors are appointed during the CEO’s
tenure. Therefore, co-option captures the effect of CEO tenure. Coles et al. (2014)
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address this issue by both controlling for CEO tenure and developing a measure
RES_CC_COOPTION, which is the residual from regression of CC_COOPTION on
CEO tenure. I follow their measure, and I control for CEO tenure and other board
governance. Another issue with the co-option measure is that it may capture the
inexperience of new directors. The newly appointed directors may be less effective
because they are new to their job, rather than because they are captured by the CEO.
Therefore, following Coles et al. (2014) I develop TW_CC_COOPTION, the director
tenure weighted co-option, which is the sum of tenure of co-opted compensation
committee directors divided by the sum of tenure of all compensation committee
directors. I also calculate RES_TW_CC_COOPTION, which is the residual from the
regression of TW_CC_COOPTION on CEO tenure.
[See Table 10 Panel A, p.89]
Table 10 Panel A reports the regression results of CEO compensation on the
alternative measures of compensation committee co-option. The coefficient on
CC_COOPTION is positive and significant (p<0.01) in column (1), suggesting that CEO
compensation positively associates with the percentage of co-opted directors on a
compensation

committee.

The

coefficients

on

TW_CC_COOPTION,

RES_CC_COOPTION, RES_TW_CC_COOPTION are all positive and significant
(p<0.01). This significance suggests that compensation committee co-option captures
more than CEO tenure and director inexperience. I also report the regression analysis of
the effect of compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors on adjusting a
CEO’s opportunistic R&D reduction and accruals management, after controlling for other
corporate governance in Table 10 Panel B and Table 10 Panel C, respectively. My
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findings still hold after controlling for CEO tenure, CEO duality, board independence,
and board size.
[See Table 10 Panel B, p.89]
[See Table 10 Panel C, p.89]
Direct CEO involvement in the firm’s director nomination process has been
reduced since 2004. NYSE Corporate Governance Section 303A, NASDAQ Rule 4350
(c), and AMEX Enhanced Corporate Governance Rules, section 805 requires that
nomination committees of listed firms must solely consist of independent directors.
Therefore, I examine the subsample consisting of firm-year observations during the
period 2004-2011. Panel D of Table 10 shows that CEO compensation is positively
associated with compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors.
[See Table 10 Panel D, p.89]
Table

10

Panel

E

shows

that

the

coefficient

on

interaction

term

HORIZON×COOPTED_CC is negative but insignificant. Table 10 Panel F reports that
the coefficient on the interaction term HORIZON×COOPTED_CC is significantly
positive, suggesting discretionary accruals is higher in firms with retiring CEOs and
compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors.
[See Table 10 Panel E, p.89]
[See Table 10 Panel F, p.89]
Table 10 Panel G shows that the coefficient on the interaction term
HORIZON×COOPTED_CC×∆RD is insignificant in all three columns. Table 10 Panel H
reports

that

the

coefficient

on

the

interaction

term

HORIZON×COOPTED_CC×POS_∆DA is significantly positive in column (1),
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suggesting that CEOs are more likely to increase their cash compensation using incomeincreasing accruals management when compensation committees are dominated by coopted directors. Overall, I do not find evidence that compensation committees dominated
by co-opted directors are less effective in alleviating R&D reduction when CEOs present
their firms with a horizon problem in the subsample. However, I still find evidence that
compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors are less effective in reducing
CEO compensation and mitigating accruals management when CEOs approach
retirement after the year of 2004.
[See Table 10 Panel G, p.89]
[See Table 10 Panel H, p.89]

5. BOARD AND COMPENSATION COMMITTEE CHARACTERISTICS
5.1 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
CEO Power
CEOs who are also chairmen of the board of directors can exert more influence
over the decision-making process (Adams et al., 2005). Jensen (1993) advocates the
separation of the CEO and chairman positions, arguing that chairmen are responsible for
overseeing CEOs, but if CEOs also hold the position of chairmen, they may act in their
own interests when they perform critical functions such as evaluating and compensating
themselves. Dechow et al. (1996) provide empirical evidence, and find that firms subject
to enforcement actions by the SEC for earnings management are more likely to have
CEOs who also serve as chairmen of the board of directors.
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Director monitoring is a critical mechanism to alleviate agency costs; however,
the effectiveness of the monitoring is reduced if the chairman of the board is assumed by
the CEO, or if most of the directors on the board are co-opted by the incumbent CEO.
Hence, I predict:
H4a: CEO compensation is positively associated with CEO power.
H4b: CEO horizon problem is positively associated with CEO power.
Director Independence
It’s been widely documented that directors who are more independent monitor
managers more effectively. Weisbach (1988) shows that boards dominated by outside
directors are more likely to remove CEOs when the companies suffer from poor
performance. A number of studies show that board independence improves the quality of
the financial reporting process. Dechow et al. (1996) find that board independence is
inversely associated with the likelihood of being charged by SEC for earnings
manipulations. Similarly, Beasley (1996) finds that board independence negatively
associates with financial statement fraud. Uzun et al. (2004) compare the governance in
firms that have committed fraud and those that have not. They note that the percentage of
independent directors is higher in firms that have not engaged in fraud than the firms that
have. Klein (2002a) documents a negative association between board independence and
abnormal accruals. Board independence also improves firm disclosures (Ajinkya et al.,
2005; Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005). Finally, Byard et al. (2006) show that the quality of
analysts’ earnings forecast an increase if the board is more independent.
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If independent directors are more aligned with shareholder benefits, I expect that
board and compensation committee independence reduce CEO pay and the CEO horizon
problem. Therefore, I hypothesize that:
H5a: CEO compensation is negatively associated with board and
compensation committee independence.
H5b: CEO horizon problem is negatively associated with board and
compensation committee independence.
Board and Compensation Committee Size
A number of scholars have expressed their concern about large board sizes
(Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996). For example, Lipton and
Lorsch (1992) suggest that board sizes should not be larger than ten members, since it is
difficult for every director to express his or her opinion freely in the limited time when
they meet. Moreover, they point out that it’s hard for a large board to become a cohesive
body due to poor communication and lack of a common purpose. Jensen (1993) argues
that boards that consist of more than seven or eight members are more subjective to CEO
control. Those two studies are consistent with organizational behavior research studies,
such as Steiner (1972) and Hackman (1990), which argue that as work groups become
larger, productivity decreases. Yermack (1996) provides empirical evidence that board
size negatively associates with a firm’s value. He also shows that firms with large boards
are less likely to have favorable profitability and operating efficiency financial ratios, to
provide CEO compensation sensitive to firm performance, and to remove CEOs.
In contrast, larger boards have a wider knowledge base and it’s easier for larger
boards to distribute the workload. For example, Klein (2002b) and Anderson et al. (2004)
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suggest that large boards are more effective in monitoring the financial accounting
process. Klein (2002b) suggests that as a board size increases, the board is more likely to
assign an independent audit committee. Consistent with her prediction, she finds that as a
board size increases, an audit committee’s independence increases. Anderson et al. (2004)
find that larger boards are associated with lower cost of debt, while Karamanou and
Vafeas (2005) find that larger boards are more likely to update management earnings
forecasts. Laksmana (2008) finds that board size increases the executive compensation
disclosure transparency.
Whether a firm can benefit from a large board of directors may depend on the
complexity of the firm (Coles et al., 2008). Coles et al. (2008) argue that complex firms,
those high in industry diversification, size, and leverage, require more advising from their
board of directors, and as a result can benefit from a large board. They find that for
simple firms, firm value decreases as board size increases; however, for complex firms,
firm value increases as board size increases. Drawing from the findings of previous
studies, I predict that the size of the board and compensation committee affects CEO
compensation and CEO horizon problem. Nevertheless, I make no prediction about the
sign. I hypothesize that:
H6a: CEO compensation is associated with board and compensation
committee size.
H6b: CEO horizon problem is associated with board and compensation
committee size.
Busy Directors
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The number of directorship may be a sign of director reputation, since an external
labor market disciplines directors by rewarding or reducing directorships based on their
performance (Kaplan and Reishus, 1990; Gilson, 1990). Kaplan and Reishus (1990) find
that CEOs whose dividends are reduced are less likely to sit on other boards. Gilson
(1990) finds that the directorships reduce after directors resign from financially distressed
firms. Consistently, Ferris et al. (2003) find that previous firm performance has a positive
effect on directors’ ability to attract directorships. Two studies examine the association
between the likelihood of being a target of takeover and number of directorships
(Shivdasani, 1993) and future directorships (Harford, 2003). Shivdasani (1993)
documents that firms with outside directors holding fewer additional directorships are
more likely to be a target of hostile takeover attempts. Harford (2003) documents that
directors of a takeover or merger target lose future directorships. Ferris et al. (2003) find
no support that busy directors are less effective monitors. They find no evidence that the
number of directorships per director or number of directorships held by outside directors
relate to firm value or the likelihood of securities fraud litigation. Moreover, they find
positive abnormal returns in an event study that announced the addition of a director who
held multiple directorships to the board for the first time, suggesting shareholders value
the reputation of directors. They also find that directors holding multiple directorships sit
on more committees and attend more committee meetings, which contrast the idea that
directors holding multiple directorships are overcommitted and shirk their responsibilities.
However, Lipton and Lorsch (1992) are concerned that directors are busy with
more than one board, and cannot emphasize one particular board. Beasley (1996)
documents a positive relationship between the number of additional directorships held by
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outside directors and the likelihood of financial statement fraud. Fich and Shivdasani
(2006) define busy directors as those who hold three or more directorships. They show
that firms with boards dominated by outside busy directors have lower market-to-book
ratios, lower operating performance, and are less likely to remove CEOs for poor
performance. They also find positive abnormal returns after busy outside directors
announce their departure. Furthermore, they find negative abnormal returns when a
director becomes a busy director as a result of obtaining one additional directorship, and
even more negative when the board becomes dominated by busy directors. Core et al.
(1999) measure busy directors as those who serve on three or more corporate boards.
They argue that by focusing on directors who hold more than two other directorships
rather than on those with average directorships, they can capture the degree of a
director’s over-commitment. They find that as the percentage of busy outside directors
increases, CEO compensation increases. Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) find that if
CEOs can exert more influence on the appointment of new directors positively, the
appointee is more likely to be a busy director and hold more board seats, which indicates
that CEOs prefer less effective monitors. If busy directors cannot devote adequate time
and attention to one particular board, the percentage of busy directors on the board or
compensation committee may increase CEO compensation and the CEO horizon problem.
Therefore, I predict:
H7a: CEO compensation is positively associated with the percentage of
busy directors on boards of directors and compensation committees.
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H7b: The CEO horizon problem is positively associated with the
percentage of busy directors on boards of directors and compensation
committees.
Director Tenure
As director tenure increases, directors gain more experience. More experienced
directors can provide higher quality governance. For example, Buchanan (1994) shows
that managers’ years of organizational service can enhance their commitment to exert
high levels of effort to achieve the goal of the firm. Beasley (1996) finds that as outside
director tenure increases, the likelihood of financial statement fraud decreases.
However, Katz (1982) finds that long tenure can be detrimental to the
communication within and outside of organizations, due to the increasing stability in
membership by studying R&D project groups with different group longevity. Vafeas
(2003a) argues that directors with long tenure are more likely to be friendly to managers.
He finds that senior directors who have held their board seats for twenty years or more in
the compensation committee pay CEOs more generously, which supports the theory that
long tenure compromises director monitoring efforts. The National Association of
Corporate Directors (1996) advocates a limit of 10 to 15 years of board service so that
new directors can bring new ideas and the board can better accommodate to the changing
business conditions. If directors are more likely to be entrenched if they hold their
directorships for a long time, I expect that the average tenure of directors on a board or a
compensation committee increases CEO compensation and the CEO horizon problem. I
hypothesize that:
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H8a: CEO compensation is positively associated with the tenure of
directors on boards of directors and compensation committees.
H8b: CEO horizon problem is positively associated with the tenure of
directors on boards of directors and compensation committees.
Director Ownership
Directors who have high equity ownership have more incentives to monitor CEOs
(Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999). Among others, Shivdasani (1993), Vafeas (2003a),
Klein (2002a), and Beasley (1996) provide evidence that directors with high ownership
are more aligned with shareholders. Shivdasani (1993) documents a negative association
between equity ownership by outside directors and the possibility of firms being a target
of hostile takeover attempts. Vafeas (2003a) shows that director ownership is rather low,
even for senior directors whose tenure is longer than twenty years. He finds a negative
relationship between director ownership and total CEO pay. Klein (2002a) documents an
inverse association between the presence of an outside blockholder on an audit committee
and abnormal accruals, indicating that director ownership affects the monitoring over
financial reporting quality. Beasley (1996) finds that directors in firms who commit fraud
have higher ownership than directors in no-fraud firms. Rosenstein and Wyatt (1997)
note that shareholders value the expertise of inside directors when they own more than
five percent of the firm’s shares when investigating the stock market reaction to the
addition of insiders in a board of directors. However, Core et al. (1999) find no empirical
evidence that CEO compensation associates with director ownership. If director
ownership enhances the alignment between directors and shareholders, I expect that as

57

director ownership increases, CEO compensation and the CEO horizon problem
decreases, holding all else constant. Hence:
H9a: CEO compensation is negatively associated with the average tenure
of directors on boards of directors and compensation committees.
H9b: The CEO horizon problem is negatively associated with the average
tenure of directors on boards of directors and compensation
committees.
5.2 Research Design
Table 11 shows the Pearson correlations between the variables in this study to
capture board and compensation committee characteristics. CC_COOPTION is the
proportion of directors who are appointed after the CEO assumes office on the
compensation committee. B_COOPTION is the proportion of directors who are appointed
after the CEO assumes office on the board of directors. COOPTED_CC is an indicator
variable equal to one if the majority of compensation committee directors are co-opted by
the incumbent CEO, and zero otherwise. COOPTED_B is an indicator variable equal to
one if the majority of directors on a board are co-opted by the incumbent CEO, and zero
otherwise. CEO_CHAIR is an indicator variable equal to one if the CEO is the chairman
of the board of directors, and zero otherwise. B_INDEPENDENCE is the proportion of
outsiders on the board of directors. CC_INDEPENDENCE is the proportion of outsiders
on a compensation committee. IND_NORM is an indicator variable equal to one if the
firm has a nominating committee that consists of only outside directors. CC_SIZE is the
number of directors on a compensation committee. B_SIZE is the number of directors on
the board of directors. Fich and Shivdasani (2006) argue that since the number of
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directorships held by directors disperses widely, the average number of directorships is a
noisy measure to identify busy directors. Therefore, I define busy directors as those who
hold more than three additional directorships. B_BUSY is the proportion of board
directors who sit on more than three other boards of public companies. CC_BUSY is the
proportion of compensation committee directors who sit on more than three other boards
of public companies. B_LONGSERV is the average tenure of directors on a board.
CC_LONGSERV is the average tenure of directors on a compensation committee.
CC_OWNERSHIP is the total shares held by directors on a compensation committee
divided by total outstanding shares. B_OWNERSHIP is the total shares held by directors
on a board divided by total outstanding shares. B_SIZE is the number of directors on
board.
[See Table 11, p.101]
Most of those variables are correlated. Therefore, I use a principal component
analysis to transform board and compensation committee characteristic variables into a
set of common factors. Consistent with Laksmana (2002), I retain all factors with an
eigenvalue greater than one. I use an oblique rotation since oblique rotation often
produces more useful patterns than do orthogonal rotations. Six factors with an
eigenvalue greater than one are retained and those six factors can explain 79.78% of the
variation.
Table 12 presents the factors identified in a principal components analysis.
CC_COOPTION, B_COOPTION, COOPTED_CC, COOPTED_B, and CEO_CHAIR
have high loadings on the first factor CEO_POWER. B_INDEPENDENCE,
CC_INDEPENDENCE

and

IND_NORM

59

load

highly

on

the

second

factor

INDEPENDENCE. Two variables, CC_SIZE and B_SIZE, have high loadings on the third
factor DIR_SIZE. B_BUSY and CC_BUSY have high loadings on the fourth factor,
BUSY_DIR.

Two

variables

measuring

director

tenure,

B_LONGSERV

and

CC_LONGSERV, load highly on the fifth factor, DIR_TENURE. CC_OWNERSHIP and
B_OWERSHIP have high loadings on the sixth factor, DIR_OWNERSHIP.
[See Table 12, p.103]
5.3 Results
Table 13 shows the regression results of CEO compensation on board and
compensation committee factors. Consistent with the prediction of H4a and H7a,
CEO_POWER (p<0.01) and BUSY_DIR (p<0.01) are positively associated with CEO
compensation. In support of H9a, DIR_OWNERSHIP is negatively associated with CEO
compensation (p<0.01). The coefficient on DIR_INDEPENDENCE, DIR_SIZE, and
DIR_TENURE is not significantly different from zero.
[See Table 13, p.104]
The multivariate analysis of the effect of board and compensation committee
factors on the association between R&D spending and the CEO horizon problem is
presented in Table 14. The coefficient on the interaction term HORIZON×CEO_POWER
is negative and significant (p=0.03), suggesting that as CEO power increases, CEOs are
more likely to reduce R&D expenditures when they approach retirement. The coefficient
on the interaction term HORIZON×DIR_TENURE is significantly negative (p=0.02),
which indicates that as the average tenure of directors on boards and compensation
committees increases, retiring CEOs are more likely to cut R&D expenditures. The
results provide support for H4b and H8b. Inconsistent with my prediction, the coefficient
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on HORIZON×DIR_INDEPENDENCE, HORIZON×DIR_SIZE, HORIZON×BUSY_DIR,
and HORIZON×DIR_OWNERSHIP is insignificant.
[See Table 14, p.105]
Table 15 reports the regression analysis of the effect of board and compensation
committee factors on the association between accruals management and the CEO horizon
problem. The coefficient on the interaction term HORIZON×DIR_SIZE is negative and
significant (p=0.02), which indicates that the size of the board and compensation
committee affect the likelihood of accruals management when CEOs present their firms
with

a

horizon

problem.

Contrary

to

expectations,

the

coefficient

on

HORIZON×DIR_OWNERSHIP is negative and marginally significant (p=0.10).
[See Table 15, p.107]

7. CONCLUSION
Directors who are co-opted by CEOs are more likely to be sympathetic to CEOs
or less willing to challenge CEOs since they feel in debt to CEOs for their directorship. I
find that the percentage of co-opted directors on compensation committees is positively
associated with CEO compensation. I also find compensation committees that are
dominated by co-opted directors tend to pay higher CEO compensation than committees
that are not dominated by co-opted directors.
Extant literature suggests that compensation committees play an important role in
mitigating the CEO horizon problem. However, the effectiveness of compensation
committees in this role varies. My results show that the percentage of co-opted directors
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on a compensation committee has a negative effect on the association between R&D
spending and the CEO horizon problem. Moreover, retiring CEOs are more likely to
reduce R&D spending if the compensation committee is dominated by co-opted directors.
I do not find evidence that the percentage of co-opted directors affects the association
between discretionary accruals and the CEO horizon problem. However, I find that CEOs
are more likely to engage in income-increasing accruals management in the final years
prior to their retirement if the compensation committee is dominated by co-opted
directors. Taken together, the findings indicate that a horizon problem exists when CEOs
approach retirement and when the compensation committee is dominated by co-opted
directors.
I further investigate whether compensation committees dominated by co-opted
directors are less effective in adjusting CEO compensation to mitigate the CEO horizon
problem. Consistent with my prediction, I document that retiring CEOs are more likely to
increase their total compensation by reducing R&D spending if compensation committees
are dominated by co-opted directors. I also document that income-increasing accruals are
more likely to be rewarded when CEOs approach retirement, and when compensation
committees are dominated by co-opted directors.
Finally, I examine whether board and compensation committee characteristics are
associated with CEO compensation and the CEO horizon problem using a principal
components analysis. I find evidence that CEO compensation is positively associated
with CEO power and busy directors, while negatively associated with director ownership.
In addition, I find that both CEO power and director tenure increases the likelihood of
R&D curtailment when CEOs approach retirement. I also find that the size of the board
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of directors and the compensation committee affect the likelihood of accruals
management when CEOs present their firms with a horizon problem.
This study contributes in three ways. First, it reveals that although CEOs’ direct
involvement in the appointment process of new directors has been reduced since 2004,
co-opted directors act as weak monitors. Second, the study adds empirical evidence to the
debate of the CEO horizon problem, finding that retiring CEOs engage in opportunistic
R&D cutting and income-increasing accruals management. Third, the study extends the
literature on corporate governance. The findings reveal that compensation committees
play an important role in mitigating the CEO horizon problem by adjusting CEO
compensation. However, the effectiveness of compensation committees in this role is
contingent on its quality.
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TABLE 1 Sample Description
Panel A: Sample Selection
Total firm-year observations in Riskmetrics for the period of 1998-2011
Firm-year observations without CEO compensation data from Execucomp
Firm-year observations missing the date when CEO was hired
Firms in the financial service sector
Firm-year observations missing Compustat inputs to calculate sales, return, and
ROA
Firm-year observations missing number of shares held by CEO
Firm-year observations at the top and bottom one percent of all continuous
variables
Final Sample
This panel presents the information about the sample selection procedure.

Panel B: Industry Composition
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n
21,681
(2,445)
(479)
(2,788)
(595)
(352)
(1,414)
13,606

Industry
Candy and Soda
Electronic Equipment
Electrical Equipment
Shipbuilding, Railroad Eq
Petroleum and Natural Gas
Textiles
Consumer Goods
Recreational Products
Precious Metals
Rubber and Plastic Products
Tobacco Products
Measuring and
Control Equip
Chemicals
Entertainment
Wholesale
Printing and Publishing
Miscellaneous
Defense
Agriculture
Construction Materials
Automobiles and Trucks
Aircraft
Business Services
Transportation
Food Products
Computers
Telecommunications
Alcoholic Beverages
Steel Works, Etc.
Machinery
Medical Equipment
Coal
Retail
Utilities
Pharmaceutical Products
Business Supplies
Personal Services

n

The percentage of compensation committees
dominated by co-opted directors

29
366
184
61
991
84
309
88
65
93
24

0.241
0.268
0.359
0.295
0.315
0.345
0.379
0.375
0.292
0.441
0.333

318

0.399

485
95
1,009
125
264
22
24
319
134
30
485
545
314
1,004
160
53
273
664
428
611
337
256
519
78
1,450

0.419
0.421
0.408
0.456
0.432
0.500
0.375
0.433
0.463
0.700
0.487
0.448
0.468
0.476
0.475
0.434
0.451
0.480
0.477
0.516
0.475
0.449
0.511
0.449
0.490
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Shipping Containers
440
0.527
Healthcare
266
0.526
Trading
124
0.565
Apparel
225
0.613
Construction
194
0.644
Fabricated Products
26
0.769
Nonmetallic Mines
35
0.629
This panel presents the number of firm-year observations in each of Fama-French (1997) 48
industries and the percentage of compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors in
each industry.

Panel C: Fiscal Year Composition
Fiscal Year

n

The percentage of compensation committees dominated
by co-opted directors

1998
1999

927
907

0.436
0.436
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2000
882
0.438
2001
938
0.425
2002
953
0.422
2003
990
0.434
2004
1,002
0.440
2005
980
0.448
2006
973
0.464
2007
892
0.478
2008
986
0.461
2009
1,027
0.479
2010
1,079
0.475
2011
1,070
0.473
This panel displays the number of firm-year observations and the percentage of compensation
committees dominated by co-opted directors in each fiscal year between 1998 and 2011.
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Panel D: Descriptive Statistics
Lower
Upper
Median
Quartile
Quartile
13,606
7.99
0.94
7.31
8.00
8.65
lnT_PAY
13,606
0.45
0.50
0.00
0.00
1.00
COOPTED_CC
13,606
7.45
1.40
6.46
7.35
8.40
SIZE
13,606
0.05
0.41
-0.22
0.02
0.26
RET
13,606
0.14
0.08
0.09
0.13
0.19
ROA
13,606
6.74
6.99
2.00
5.00
9.00
CEO_TENURE
15.54
36.89
0.94
2.90
10.03
CEO_OWNERSHIP 13,606
13,606
0.71
0.45
0.00
1.00
1.00
CEO_CHAIR
0.72
0.16
0.63
0.75
0.86
B_INDEPENDENCE 13,606
13,606
63,423.10
93,799.10
8,777.73
25,292.56
73,053.44
B_OWNERSHIP
13,606
9.10
2.40
7.00
9.00
11.00
B_SIZE
13,606
0.65
0.48
0.00
1.00
1.00
B_FEMALE
This panel displays the descriptive statistics. lnT_PAY is the natural logarithm of CEO total
compensation. CEO total compensation includes salary, bonus, other annual compensation,
restricted stock grants, long-term incentive payouts, all other compensation, and value of option
grants (EXECUCOMP data item TDC1). It is adjusted to 2003 dollars using Consumer Price
Index. COOPTED_CC is an indicator variable equal to one if the majority of compensation
committee directors are appointed after the incumbent CEO assumes office, and zero otherwise.
SIZE is the natural logarithm of sales. RET is the firm’s stock return. ROA is the earnings before
extraordinary item divided by total assets. CEO_TENURE is the CEO tenure.
CEO_OWNERSHIP is the proportion of the firm's outstanding shares held by the CEO.
CEO_CHAIR is an indicator variable equal to one if CEO is the chairman of the board of
directors, and zero otherwise. B_INDEPENDENCE is the proportion of outsiders on board of
directors. B_OWNERSHIP is the proportion of the firm's outstanding shares held by directors on
the board. B_SIZE is the number of directors on the board. B_FEMALE is an indicator equal to
one if at least one of the directors on board is female, and zero otherwise.
Variable

n

Mean

Std Dev
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Panel E: Pearson Correlations
lnT_PAY

SIZE

RET

ROA

CEO_TENURE

CEO_OWNE
RSHIP

B_INDEPEND
ENCE

B_OWNER
SHIP

B_SIZE

SIZE
0.60
-0.02
RET
0.04
ROA
0.14
0.11
0.06
CEO_TENURE
-0.06
-0.10 -0.00 0.01
CEO_OWNERSHIP
-0.21
-0.15 0.00 0.06
0.39
B_INDEPENDENCE
0.18
0.18
0.02 -0.05
-0.11
-0.24
B_OWNERSHIP
-0.22
-0.18 0.02 0.04
0.17
0.47
-0.41
B_SIZE
0.31
0.53 -0.03 0.02
-0.11
-0.15
0.05
-0.04
B_FEMALE
0.25
0.41 -0.01 0.05
-0.14
-0.14
0.2
-0.14
0.47
This panel displays the Pearson correlations. lnT_PAY is the natural logarithm of CEO total compensation. CEO total compensation
includes salary, bonus, other annual compensation, restricted stock grants, long-term incentive payouts, all other compensation, and
value of option grants (EXECUCOMP data item TDC1). It is adjusted to 2003 dollars using Consumer Price Index. SIZE is the natural
logarithm of sales. RET is the firm’s stock return. ROA is the earnings before extraordinary item divided by total assets. CEO_TENURE
is the CEO tenure. CEO_OWNERSHIP is the proportion of the firm's outstanding shares held by CEO. B_INDEPENDENCE is the
proportion of outsiders on the board of directors. B_OWNERSHIP is the proportion of the firm's outstanding shares held by directors on
the board. B_SIZE is the number of directors on the board. B_FEMALE is an indicator equal to one if at least one of the directors on the
board is female, and zero otherwise. Correlations with p-values equal to or lower than 0.05 are in boldface.
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TABLE 2 Regression Results: The effect of compensation committee dominated by co-opted
directors on CEO compensation
Dependent Variable = lnT_PAY
Predicted Sign
Coefficient
4.880
+
0.071
+
0.374
+
0.106
+
1.132
+
0.001
?
-0.003
+
0.130
?
0.207
-0.000
+
0.002
?
-0.036

Variable
p-value
Intercept
(<0.01)
(<0.01)
COOPTED_CC
(<0.01)
SIZE
(<0.01)
RET
(<0.01)
ROA
(0.32)
CEO_TENURE
(<0.01)
CEO_OWNERSHIP
(<0.01)
CEO_CHAIR
(<0.01)
B_INDEPENDENCE
(<0.01)
B_OWNERSHIP
(0.32)
B_SIZE
(0.03)
B_FEMALE
Observations
13,606
2
R
40.15%
This table presents regression results for model (2). lnT_PAY is the natural logarithm of CEO
total compensation. CEO total compensation includes salary, bonus, other annual compensation,
restricted stock grants, long-term incentive payouts, all other compensation, and value of option
grants (EXECUCOMP data item TDC1). It is adjusted to 2003 dollars using Consumer Price
Index. COOPTED_CC is an indicator variable equal to one if the majority of compensation
committee directors are appointed after the incumbent CEO assumes office, and zero otherwise.
SIZE is the natural logarithm of sales. RET is the firm’s stock return. ROA is the earnings before
extraordinary item divided by total assets. CEO_TENURE is the CEO tenure.
CEO_OWNERSHIP is the proportion of the firm's outstanding shares held by CEO. CEO_CHAIR
is an indicator variable equal to one if CEO is the chairman of the board of directors, and zero
otherwise. B_INDEPENDENCE is the proportion of outsiders on the board of directors.
B_OWNERSHIP is the proportion of the firm's outstanding shares held by directors on the
board.B_SIZE is the number of directors on the board. B_FEMALE is an indicator equal to one if
at least one of the directors on the board is female, and zero otherwise. The p-values are presented
in parentheses and are one-tailed for coefficients that have the predicted sign and two-tailed for
those without a predicted sign or those that do not have the predicted sign. The standard errors are
heteroskedasticity robust, clustered by firm and year. For the sake of brevity, we do not report
coefficient estimates for year indicators and G index dummies.
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TABLE 3 Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlations for the R&D Test
Panel A : Descriptive Statistics
Lower
Upper
Variable
n
Mean Std Dev
Median
Quartile
Quartile
5,599
0.04
0.05
0.00
0.03
0.07
RD
5,599
0.08
0.27
0.00
0.00
0.00
HORIZON
5,599
0.62
0.49
0.00
1.00
1.00
COOPTED_CC
5,599
2.07
1.13
1.32
1.72
2.46
TOBINS_Q
5,599
0.10
0.45
-0.21
0.05
0.31
LAG_RET
5,599
0.11
0.13
0.05
0.11
0.17
FCF
5,599
0.13
0.10
0.07
0.12
0.19
ROA
5,599
7.29
1.43
6.22
7.12
8.23
SIZE
5,599
26.15
16.64
12.00
20.00
41.00
FIRM_AGE
5,599 629.56 1,288.63
88.13
227.47
605.18
EQUITY_INCENTIVES
5,599
0.15
0.17
0.01
0.12
0.20
INDUSTRY_RD
This panel reports the descriptive statistics. RD is the R&D expense scaled by total assets.
COOPTED_CC is an indicator variable equal to one if the majority of compensation committee
directors are appointed after the incumbent CEO assumes office, and zero otherwise. HORIZON
is an indicator variable equal to one if CEOs are in each of the final two years prior to their
retirement, and zero otherwise. TOBINS_Q is calculated as the market value of equity plus the
book value of debt, all scaled by total assets. LAG_RET is the firm’s stock return from previous
year. FCF is the operating cash flows plus R&D expense minus capital expenditures, all scaled
by sales. ROA is operating net income before R&D expense scaled by assets. SIZE is the natural
logarithm of total assets at the beginning of the current year. FIRM_AGE is the number of years
between the current year and the first year the company listed on Compustat.
EQUITY_INCENTIVES is the CEO's dollar wealth increase from a 1% change in stock price, as
measured in Core and Guay (2002). INDUSTRY_RD is the average R&D expenditures of other
firms in the same 2-digit SIC industry.
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Panel B: Pearson Correlations
RD
TOBINS_Q LAG_RET
FCF
ROA
SIZE
FIRM_AGE EQUITY_INCENTIVES
TOBINS_Q
0.26
0.00
LAG_RET
0.12
FCF
-0.43
0.17
0.03
ROA
0.33
0.58
0.17
0.25
SIZE
-0.19
-0.08
-0.05
0.16
-0.07
FIRM_AGE
-0.19
-0.15
-0.05
0.03
-0.07
0.51
0.02
EQUITY_INCENTIVES
0.35
0.04
0.12
0.14
0.22
-0.05
0.02
0.01
INDUSTRY_RD
0.31
0.09
-0.09
0.15
0.08
-0.03
This panel reports the Pearson correlations. RD is the R&D expense scaled by total assets. TOBINS_Q is calculated as the market value of
equity plus the book value of debt, all scaled by total assets. LAG_RET is the firm’s stock return from previous year. FCF is the operating
cash flows plus R&D expense minus capital expenditures, all scaled by sales. ROA is operating net income before R&D expense scaled by
assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets at the beginning of the current year. FIRM_AGE is the number of years between the
current year and the first year the company listed on Compustat. EQUITY_INCENTIVES is the CEO's dollar wealth increase from a 1%
change in stock price, as measured in Core and Guay (2002). INDUSTRY_RD is the average R&D expenditures of other firms in the same
2-digit SIC industry. Correlations with p-values equal to or lower than 0.05 are in boldface.
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TABLE 4 Regression Results: The effect of whether compensation committees are
dominated by co-opted directors on the association between R&D spending and CEO
horizon problem
Dependent Variable = RD
Variable
Predicted Sign
Coefficient
P-value
Intercept
0.028
(<0.01)
?
0.003
(0.27)
HORIZON
?
0.003
(<0.01)
COOPTED_CC
-0.006
(0.03)
HORIZON×COOPTED_CC
+
0.005
(<0.01)
TOBINS_Q
+
-0.007
(<0.01)
LAG_RET
+
-0.198
(<0.01)
FCF
0.187
(<0.01)
ROA
?
0.000
(0.80)
SIZE
-0.000
(<0.01)
FIRM_AGE
+
-0.000
(0.30)
EQUITY_INCENTIVES
+
0.064
(<0.01)
INDUSTRY_RD
Number of observations
5,599
R2
47,33%
The table presents OLS regression results for model (3). RD is the R&D expense scaled by total
assets. COOPTED_CC is an indicator variable equal to one if the majority of compensation
committee directors are appointed after the incumbent CEO assumes office, and zero otherwise.
HORIZON is an indicator variable equal to one if CEOs are in each of the final two years prior to
their retirement, and zero otherwise. TOBINS_Q is calculated as the market value of equity plus
the book value of debt, all scaled by total assets. LAG_RET is the firm’s stock return from
previous year. FCF is the operating cash flows plus R&D expense minus capital expenditures, all
scaled by sales. ROA is operating net income before R&D expense scaled by assets. SIZE is the
natural logarithm of total assets at the beginning of the current year. FIRM_AGE is the number of
years between the current year and the first year the company listed on Compustat.
EQUITY_INCENTIVES is the CEO's dollar wealth increase from a 1% change in stock price, as
measured in Core and Guay (2002). INDUSTRY_RD is the average R&D expenditures of other
firms in the same 2-digit SIC industry. The p-values are presented in parentheses and are onetailed for coefficients that have the predicted sign and two-tailed for those without a predicted
sign or those that do not have the predicted sign. The standard errors are heteroskedasticity
robust, clustered by firm and year. For the sake of brevity, we do not report coefficient estimates
for year indicators.
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TABLE 5 Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlations for the Discretionary Accruals
Test
Panel A : Descriptive Statistics
Lower
Upper
Variable
n
Mean
Std Dev
Median
Quartile
Quartile
8,541
0.01
0.84
-0.07
0.01
0.12
DA
8,541
0.08
0.27
0.00
0.00
0.00
HORIZON
8,541
0.62
0.48
0.00
1.00
1.00
COOPTED_CC
8,541
0.25
0.22
0.09
0.17
0.34
EQUITY_INCENTIVES
8,541
7.38
1.42
6.31
7.23
8.32
SIZE
8,541
0.04
0.03
0.02
0.04
0.06
STD_CASHFLOW
8,541
0.14
0.10
0.06
0.11
0.18
STD_REV
8,541
0.19
0.17
0.08
0.13
0.24
STD_SALESGROWTH
8,541
0.55
0.50
0.00
1.00
1.00
OLDFIRM
8,541
0.22
0.16
0.06
0.22
0.34
LEVERAGE
This panel presents the descriptive statistics. DA is the discretionary accruals. COOPTED_CC is
an indicator variable equal to one if the majority of compensation committee directors are
appointed after the incumbent CEO assumes office, and zero otherwise. HORIZON is an indicator
variable equal to one if CEOs are in each of the final two years prior to their retirement, and zero
otherwise. EQUITY_INCENTIVES is the dollar change in CEO's wealth from a 1% change in
stock price, as measured in Core and Guay (2002), then normalized by the sum of the dollar
change, salary and bonus. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets at the beginning of the
current year. STD_CASHFLOW is the standard deviation of cash flows from operations deflated
by total assets over the current and previous four years. STD_REV is the standard deviation of
sales deflated by total assets over the current and previous four years. STD_SALESGROWTH is
the standard deviation of sales growth over the current and previous four years. OLDFIRM equals
one if a firm is listed on Compustat for more than 20 years, and zero otherwise. LEVERAGE is
total liabilities deflated by total assets.
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Panel B : Pearson Correlations
DA EQUITY_INCENTIVES SIZE STD_CASHFLOW STD_REV STD_SALESGROWTH OLDFIRM
EQUITY_INCENTIVES -0.01
0.02
SIZE
0.04
-0.02
-0.01
STD_CASHFLOW
-0.31
0.01
-0.02
STD_REV
-0.19
0.36
0.01
-0.00
STD_SALESGROWTH
-0.04
0.27
0.24
OLDFIRM
0.03
-0.15
0.36
-0.17
-0.08
-0.14
LEVERAGE
0.02
-0.2
0.38
-0.19
-0.07
0.05
0.18
This panel presents the Pearson correlations. DA is the discretionary accruals. EQUITY_INCENTIVES is the dollar change in CEO's
wealth from a 1% change in stock price, as measured in Core and Guay (2002), then normalized by the sum of the dollar change, salary
and bonus. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets at the beginning of the current year. STD_CASHFLOW is the standard deviation of
cash flows from operations deflated by total assets over the current and previous four years. STD_REV is the standard deviation of sales
deflated by total assets over the current and previous four years. STD_SALESGROWTH is the standard deviation of sales growth over the
current and previous four years. OLDFIRM equals one if a firm is listed on Compustat for more than 20 years, and zero otherwise.
LEVERAGE is total liabilities deflated by total assets. Correlations with p-values equal to or lower than 0.05 are in boldface. Correlations
with p-values equal to or lower than 0.05 are in boldface.
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TABLE 6 Regression Results: The effect of whether compensation committees are
dominated by co-opted directors on the association between discretionary accruals and
CEO horizon problem
Dependent Variable = DA
Variable
Predicted Sign
Coefficient
P-value
Intercept
0.213
(0.06)
+
-0.041
(0.38)
HORIZON
?
-0.053
(0.01)
COOPTED_CC
+
0.103
(0.05)
HORIZON×COOPTED_CC
+
0.048
(0.17)
EQUITY_INCENTIVES
-0.006
(0.23)
SIZE
?
-0.807
(0.06)
STD_CASHFLOW
?
0.147
(0.18)
STD_REV
?
-0.005
(0.94)
STD_SALESGROWTH
?
0.022
(0.33)
OLDFIRM
?
-0.001
(0.99)
LEVERAGE
?
-0.005
(0.29)
MARKETTOBOOK
Number of observations
8,541
2
R
4.66%
The table presents OLS regression results for model (4). DA is the discretionary accruals.
COOPTED_CC is an indicator variable equal to one if the majority of compensation committee
directors are appointed after the incumbent CEO assumes office, and zero otherwise. HORIZON
is an indicator variable equal to one if CEOs are in each of the final two years prior to their
retirement, and zero otherwise. EQUITY_INCENTIVES is the dollar change in CEO's wealth from
a 1% change in stock price, as measured in Core and Guay (2002), then normalized by the sum of
the dollar change, salary and bonus. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets at the beginning
of the current year. STD_CASHFLOW is the standard deviation of cash flows from operations
deflated by total assets over the current and previous four years. STD_REV is the standard
deviation of sales deflated by total assets over the current and previous four years.
STD_SALESGROWTH is the standard deviation of sales growth over the current and previous
four years. OLDFIRM equals one if a firm is listed on Compustat for more than 20 years, and
zero otherwise. LEVERAGE is total liabilities deflated by total assets. MARKETTOBOOK
represents deciles of market value of assets divided by the book value of assets ranked within
each year. The p-values are presented in parentheses and are one-tailed for coefficients that have
the predicted sign and two-tailed for those without a predicted sign or those that do not have the
predicted sign. The standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust, clustered by firm and year. For
the sake of brevity, we do not report coefficient estimates for year indicators, G_index indicators,
exchange indicators and industry indicators.
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TABLE 7 Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlations for the Change in CEO
Compensation Test
Panel A : Descriptive Statistics
Variable

n

Mean

Std Dev

Lower
Quartile

Median

Upper
Quartile

8,950
-0.02
0.33
-0.08
0.01
0.11
∆lnC_PAY
8,889
0.05
0.75
-0.20
0.04
0.32
∆lnT_PAY
8,763
0.19
3.27
-0.29
0.07
0.51
∆lnL_PAY
8,950
0.01
0.06
-0.01
0.01
0.03
∆ROA
8,950
-0.01
0.09
-0.06
-0.01
0.04
ADJ_RET
8,950
0.33
0.94
0.00
0.00
0.16
POS_∆DA
8,950
-0.35
0.98
-0.17
-0.00
0.00
NEG_∆DA
8,950
0.08
0.27
0.00
0.00
0.00
HORIZON
8,950
0.62
0.49
0.00
1.00
1.00
COOPTED_CC
8,950
601.68
1168.79
79.31
212.20
559.31
EQUITY_INCENTIVES
5,380
0.01
0.02
0.00
0.00
0.01
∆RD
This panel presents the descriptive statistics. ∆lnC_PAY is the change in the natural logarithm of
CEO salary and bonus. ∆lnT_PAY is the change in the natural logarithm of CEO total
compensation (EXECUCOMP data item TDC1). ∆lnL_PAY is the change in natural logarithm of
CEO long-term compensation, which is defined as the sum of restricted stock grants, value of
option grants, and long-term incentive payouts. All the compensation measures are adjusted to
2003 dollars using Consumer Price Index. ∆ROA is the change in earnings before extraordinary
items, scaled by lagged total assets. ADJ_RET is the firm’s annual size-adjusted stock return.
POS_∆DA is the positive changes in discretionary accruals. NEG_∆DA is the negative changes in
discretionary accruals. HORIZON is an indicator variable equal to one if CEOs are in each of the
final two years prior to their retirement, and zero otherwise. COOPTED_CC is an indicator
variable equal to one if the majority of compensation committee directors are appointed after the
incumbent CEO assumes office, and zero otherwise. EQUITY_INCENTIVES is the CEO's dollar
wealth increase from a 1% change in stock price, as measured in Core and Guay (2002). ∆RD is
the change in R&D expenditures, scaled by lagged total assets.
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Panel B: Pearson Correlations
∆lnC_PAY
∆lnT_PAY ∆lnL_PAY
∆ROA
ADJ_RET
∆lnT_PAY
0.2
-0.00
∆lnL_PAY
0.5
∆ROA
0.19
0.14
0.04
0.02
ADJ_RET
0.05
0.04
0.02
0.01
EQUITY_INCENTIVES
0.03
0.03
0.08
0.03
This panel presents the Pearson correlations. ∆lnC_PAY is the change in the natural logarithm of
CEO salary and bonus. ∆lnT_PAY is the change in the natural logarithm of CEO total
compensation (EXECUCOMP data item TDC1). ∆lnL_PAY is the change in natural logarithm of
CEO long-term compensation, which is defined as the sum of restricted stock grants, value of
option grants, and long-term incentive payouts. All the compensation measures are adjusted to
2003 dollars using Consumer Price Index. ∆ROA is the change in earnings before extraordinary
items, scaled by lagged total assets. ADJ_RET is the firm’s annual size-adjusted stock return.
EQUITY_INCENTIVES is the CEO's dollar wealth increase from a 1% change in stock price, as
measured in Core and Guay (2002).
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TABLE 8 Regression Results: The effect of whether compensation committees are
dominated by co-opted directors and whether CEOs are approaching retirements on the
association between the change in CEO compensation and the change in R&D
Dependent Variable
∆lnC_PAY (1)
∆lnT_PAY (2)
∆lnL_PAY (3)
Pred.
Sign Coeff. P-value
Variable
Coeff. P-value
Coeff. P-value
Intercept
-0.016 (0.08)
-0.001 (0.97)
-0.019 (0.78)
+
1.034 (<0.01)
1.574 (<0.01)
1.627
(0.03)
∆ROA
+
0.125
(0.01)
0.293
(0.02)
0.519
(0.14)
ADJ_RET
?
0.073
(0.85)
0.383
(0.68)
1.814
(0.67)
∆RD
?
0.029
(0.25)
-0.074 (0.16)
-0.571 (0.07)
HORIZON
?
0.004
(0.67)
0.007
(0.75)
0.006
(0.95)
COOPTED_CC
0.353
(0.24)
-0.067 (0.46)
2.638
(0.54)
HORIZON×∆ROA
+
-0.030 (0.84)
-0.377 (0.30)
-0.661 (0.84)
HORIZON×RET
?
-2.440 (0.21)
5.447
(0.09)
-5.988 (0.65)
HORIZON×∆RD
HORIZON×COOPTED_
?
-0.028 (0.39)
0.031
(0.64)
0.730
(0.08)
CC
?
0.770
(0.10)
0.367
(0.79)
-1.347 (0.79)
COOPTED_CC×∆RD
HORIZON×COOPTED
1.314
(0.57)
-6.880 (0.05)
-22.84 (0.30)
_CC×∆RD
?
0.000
(0.60)
EQUITY_INCENTIVES
No. of observations
5,380
5,354
5,277
R2
17.44%
2.76%
1.01%
The table presents OLS regression results for model (5). ∆lnC_PAY is the change in the natural
logarithm of CEO salary and bonus. ∆lnT_PAY is the change in the natural logarithm of CEO
total compensation (EXECUCOMP data item TDC1). ∆lnL_PAY is the change in natural
logarithm of CEO long-term compensation, which is defined as the sum of restricted stock grants,
value of option grants, and long-term incentive payouts. All the compensation measures are
adjusted to 2003 dollars using Consumer Price Index. ∆ROA is the change in earnings before
extraordinary items, scaled by lagged total assets. ADJ_RET is the firm’s annual size-adjusted
stock return. ∆RD is the change in R&D expenditures, scaled by lagged total assets. HORIZON is
an indicator variable equal to one if CEOs are in each of the final two years prior to their
retirement, and zero otherwise. COOPTED_CC is an indicator variable equal to one if the
majority of compensation committee directors are appointed after the incumbent CEO assumes
office, and zero otherwise. EQUITY_INCENTIVES is the CEO's dollar wealth increase from a 1%
change in stock price, as measured in Core and Guay (2002). The p-values are presented in
parentheses and are two-tailed. The standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust, clustered by
firm and year. For the sake of brevity, we do not report coefficient estimates for year indicators.
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TABLE 9 Regression Results: The effect of whether compensation committees are
dominated by co-opted directors and whether CEOs are approaching retirements on the
association between the change in CEO compensation and the change in discretionary
accruals
Dependent Variable
∆lnC_PAY (1)
∆lnT_PAY (2)
∆lnL_PAY (3)
Variable
Coeff. P-value
Coeff. P-value
Coeff. P-value
Intercept
-0.009 (0.25)
0.022
(0.27)
0.034
(0.66)
+ 1.015 (<0.01)
1.621 (<0.01)
1.886 (<0.01)
∆ROA
+ 0.184 (<0.01)
0.326 (<0.01)
0.905
(0.02)
ADJ_RET
? 0.000
(0.98)
-0.019 (0.19)
0.058
(0.64)
POS_∆DA
? 0.015
(0.01)
-0.005 (0.71)
-0.018 (0.73)
NEG_∆DA
? 0.043
(0.06)
-0.035 (0.40)
-0.291 (0.03)
HORIZON
? 0.008
(0.33)
0.008
(0.63)
0.037
(0.66)
COOPTED_CC
- 0.047
(0.86)
-0.177 (0.36)
2.279
(0.23)
HORIZON×∆ROA
+ -0.024 (0.85)
-0.255 (0.34)
-0.426 (0.84)
HORIZON×RET
? -0.002 (0.88)
-0.051 (0.22)
-0.838 (0.23)
HORIZON×POS_∆DA
? 0.016
(0.50)
0.028
(0.40)
-0.059 (0.61)
HORIZON×NEG_∆DA
-0.006 (0.91)
0.249
(0.28)
HORIZON×COOPTED_CC ? -0.066 (0.02)
-0.002 (0.93)
-0.080 (0.53)
COOPTED_CC×POS_∆DA ? -0.005 (0.47)
0.005
(0.77)
0.014
(0.85)
COOPTED_CC×NEG_∆DA ? -0.016 (0.02)
HORIZON×COOPTED_CC
×POS_∆DA

+

0.034

(0.08)

0.040

(0.24)

0.883

(0.11)

HORIZON×COOPTED_CC
×NEG_∆DA

?

-0.017

(0.53)

-0.018

(0.69)

0.141

(0.40)

?

-0.000 (0.98)
8,950

EQUITY_INCENTIVES
No. of observations
2

8,889

8,763

R
16.28%
2.98%
0.97%
The table presents regression results for model (6). ∆lnC_PAY is the change in the natural
logarithm of CEO salary and bonus. ∆lnT_PAY is the change in the natural logarithm of CEO
total compensation. ∆lnL_PAY is the change in natural logarithm of CEO long-term
compensation. ∆ROA is the change in earnings before extraordinary items, scaled by lagged total
assets. ADJ_RET is the firm’s annual size-adjusted stock return. POS_∆DA is the positive
changes in discretionary accruals. NEG_∆DA is the negative changes in discretionary accruals.
HORIZON is an indicator variable equal to one if CEOs are in each of the final two years prior to
their retirement, and zero otherwise. COOPTED_CC is an indicator variable equal to one if the
majority of compensation committee directors are appointed after the incumbent CEO assumes
office, and zero otherwise. EQUITY_INCENTIVES is the CEO's dollar wealth increase from a 1%
change in stock price, as measured in Core and Guay (2002). The p-values are presented in
parentheses and are one-tailed for coefficients that have the predicted sign and two-tailed for
those without a predicted sign or those that do not have the predicted sign. The standard errors are
heteroskedasticity robust, clustered by firm and year. For the sake of brevity, we do not report
coefficient estimates for year indicators.
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TABLE 10 Robustness Tests
Panel A: CEO compensation regressed on the alternative measures of compensation
committee co-option
Dependent Variable = lnT_PAY
Compensation committee co-option measures
Variable
Intercept
Co-option measures

+

SIZE

+

RET

+

ROA

+

CEO_TENURE

+

CEO_OWNERSHIP

?

CEO_CHAIR

+

B_INDEPENDENCE

?

B_OWNERSHIP

-

B_SIZE

+

B_FEMALE

?

Observations
R2

CC_COOP
TION(1)

TW_CC_COO
PTION(2)

RES_CC_COOP
TION(3)

RES_TW_CC_
COOPTION(4)

4.872
(<0.01)
0.128
(<0.01)
0.374
(<0.01)
0.106
(<0.01)
1.134
(<0.01)
-0.001
(0.71)
-0.003
(<0.01)
0.127
(<0.01)
0.202
(<0.01)
-0.000
(<0.01)
0.002
(0.28)
-0.036
(0.02)
13,606
40.20%

4.881
(<0.01)
0.124
(<0.01)
0.374
(<0.01)
0.106
(<0.01)
1.136
(<0.01)
-0.000
(0.83)
-0.003
(<0.01)
0.128
(<0.01)
0.204
(<0.01)
-0.000
(<0.01)
0.003
(0.23)
-0.036
(0.02)
13,598
40.18%

4.894
(<0.01)
0.128
(<0.01)
0.374
(<0.01)
0.106
(<0.01)
1.134
(<0.01)
0.004
(<0.01)
-0.003
(<0.01)
0.127
(<0.01)
0.202
(<0.01)
-0.000
(<0.01)
0.002
(0.28)
-0.036
(0.02)
13,606
40.20%

4.890
(<0.01)
0.124
(<0.01)
0.374
(<0.01)
0.106
(<0.01)
1.136
(<0.01)
0.004
(<0.01)
-0.003
(<0.01)
0.128
(<0.01)
0.204
(<0.01)
-0.000
(<0.01)
0.003
(0.23)
-0.036
(0.02)
13,598
40.18%
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The table reports regression results for model (2) using alternative measures of compensation
committee co-option. lnT_PAY is the natural logarithm of CEO total compensation
(EXECUCOMP data item TDC1). CC_COOPTION is the proportion of directors who are
appointed after the CEO assumes office on the compensation committee. TW_CC_COOPTION
is the director tenure weighted co-option, which is the sum of tenure of co-opted Compensation
Committee directors divided by the sum of tenure of all compensation committee directors.
RES_CC_COOPTION is the residual from regression of CC_COOPTION on CEO tenure.
RES_TW_CC_COOPTION is the residual from the regression of TW_CC_COOPTION on CEO
tenure. SIZE is the natural logarithm of sales. RET is the firm’s stock return. ROA is the earnings
before extraordinary item divided by total assets. CEO_TENURE is the CEO tenure.
CEO_OWNERSHIP is the proportion of the firm's outstanding shares held by CEO.
CEO_CHAIR is an indicator variable equal to one if CEO is the chairman of the board of
directors, and zero otherwise. B_INDEPENDENCE is the proportion of outsiders on the board
of directors. B_OWNERSHIP is the proportion of the firm's outstanding shares held by directors
on the board B_SIZE is the number of directors on the board. B_FEMALE is an indicator equal
to one if at least one of the directors on the board is female, and zero otherwise. The p-values are
presented in parentheses and are one-tailed for coefficients that have the predicted sign and twotailed for those without a predicted sign or those that do not have the predicted sign. The
standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust, clustered by firm and year. For the sake of brevity,
we do not report coefficient estimates for year indicators and G index dummies.
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Panel B: The effect of compensation committee dominated by co-opted directors on
adjusting CEO compensation to mitigate R&D reduction after controlling for other
corporate governance
Dependent Variable
∆lnC_PAY (1)
∆lnT_PAY (2)
∆lnL_PAY (3)
Pred.
Sign
Variable
Coeff. P-value
Coeff. P-value
Coeff. P-value
Intercept
0.010
(0.80)
0.065
(0.41)
-0.067
(0.93)
+
1.031 (<0.01)
1.572 (<0.01)
1.604
(0.03)
∆ROA
+
0.126
(0.01)
0.295
(0.02)
0.533
(0.13)
ADJ_RET
?
0.026
(0.95)
0.262
(0.78)
1.270
(0.76)
∆RD
?
0.031
(0.22)
-0.063 (0.22)
-0.554
(0.08)
HORIZON
?
0.003
(0.81)
0.029
(0.30)
-0.019
(0.85)
COOPTED_CC
0.351
(0.24)
-0.068 (0.46)
2.632
(0.54)
HORIZON×∆ROA
+
-0.037 (0.81)
-0.384 (0.29)
-0.745
(0.82)
HORIZON×ADJ_RET
?
-2.365 (0.23)
5.490
(0.09)
-4.531
(0.73)
HORIZON×∆RD
HORIZON×COOPTE
?
-0.027 (0.40)
0.031
(0.64)
0.742
(0.07)
D_CC
?
0.784
(0.10)
0.459
(0.74)
-1.148
(0.82)
COOPTED_CC×∆RD
HORIZON×COOPTE
1.275
(0.59)
-6.717 (0.05)
-24.179 (0.28)
D_CC×∆RD
?
-0.000 (0.99)
-0.033 (0.09)
0.009
(0.92)
lnCEO_TENURE
?
-0.007 (0.48)
-0.024 (0.41)
-0.045
(0.66)
CEO_CHAIR
?
0.025
(0.62)
0.075
(0.49)
0.683
(0.44)
B_INDDIR
?
-0.022 (0.20)
-0.034 (0.41)
-0.283
(0.17)
lnB_SIZE
EQUITY_INCENTIVE
?
0.000
(0.48)
S
No. of observations
5,380
5,354
5,277
R2

17.49%

2.84%
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1.07%

The table reports regression results for model (5) after controlling for other corporate governance.
∆lnC_PAY is the change in the natural logarithm of CEO salary and bonus. ∆lnT_PAY is the
change in the natural logarithm of CEO total compensation (EXECUCOMP data item TDC1).
∆lnL_PAY is the change in natural logarithm of CEO long-term compensation, which is defined
as the sum of restricted stock grants, value of option grants, and long-term incentive payouts. All
the compensation measures are adjusted to 2003 dollars using Consumer Price Index. ∆ROA is
the change in earnings before extraordinary items, scaled by lagged total assets. ADJ_RET is the
firm’s annual size-adjusted stock return. ∆RD is the change in R&D expenditures, scaled by
lagged total assets. HORIZON is an indicator variable equal to one if CEOs are in each of the
final two years prior to their retirement, and zero otherwise. COOPTED_CC is an indicator
variable equal to one if the majority of compensation committee directors are appointed after the
incumbent CEO assumes office, and zero otherwise. lnCEO_TENURE is the natural logarithm of
CEO tenure. CEO_CHAIR is an indicator variable equal to one if CEO is the chairman of the
board of directors, and zero otherwise. B_INDDIR is an indicator variable equal to one if the
board of directors solely consists of outsiders, and zero otherwise. lnB_SIZE is the natural
logarithm of number of directors on the board. EQUITY_INCENTIVES is the CEO's dollar wealth
increase from a 1% change in stock price, as measured in Core and Guay (2002). The p-values
are presented in parentheses and are one-tailed for coefficients that have the predicted sign and
two-tailed for those without a predicted sign or those that do not have the predicted sign. The
standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust, clustered by firm and year. For the sake of brevity,
we do not report coefficient estimates for year indicators.
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Panel C: The effect of compensation committee dominated by co-opted directors on
adjusting CEO compensation to mitigate income-increasing accruals management after
controlling for other corporate governance
Dependent Variable
∆lnC_PAY (1)
∆lnT_PAY (2)
∆lnL_PAY (3)
Variable
Coeff.
P-value
Coeff.
P-value
Coeff. P-value
Intercept
0.031
(0.33)
0.064
(0.32)
-0.252 (0.64)
+
1.012
(<0.01)
1.620
(<0.01)
1.879 (<0.01)
∆ROA
+
0.184
(<0.01)
0.330
(<0.01)
0.939
(0.02)
ADJ_RET
?
-0.000
(0.96)
-0.019
(0.18)
0.054
(0.66)
POS_∆DA
?
0.015
(0.01)
-0.005
(0.73)
-0.014 (0.78)
NEG_∆DA
?
0.046
(0.04)
-0.027
(0.52)
-0.271 (0.04)
HORIZON
?
0.009
(0.29)
0.030
(0.14)
0.056
(0.54)
COOPTED_CC
0.045
(0.86)
-0.165
(0.37)
2.273
(0.46)
HORIZON×∆ROA
+ -0.030
(0.81)
-0.258
(0.34)
-0.472 (0.83)
HORIZON×RET
?
-0.002
(0.89)
-0.050
(0.23)
-0.837 (0.23)
HORIZON×POS_∆DA
0.016
(0.51)
0.028
(0.40)
-0.069 (0.55)
HORIZON×NEG_∆DA ?
HORIZON×COOPTED
?
-0.065
(0.02)
-0.002
(0.97)
0.276
(0.23)
_CC
COOPTED_CC×POS_
?
-0.005
(0.48)
-0.001
(0.96)
-0.080 (0.53)
∆DA
COOPTED_CC×NEG_
?
-0.016
(0.02)
0.005
(0.77)
0.015
(0.84)
∆DA
HORIZON×COOPTE
+
0.034
(0.08)
0.042
(0.23)
0.885
(0.11)
D_CC×POS_∆DA
HORIZON×COOPTED
?
-0.017
(0.54)
-0.017
(0.71)
0.156
(0.35)
_CC×NEG_∆DA
?
0.000
(0.71)
-0.035
(0.01)
-0.060 (0.41)
lnCEO_TENURE
?
-0.006
(0.35)
-0.014
(0.48)
-0.013 (0.85)
CEO_CHAIR
?
-0.006
(0.44)
0.101
(0.23)
1.034
(0.10)
B_INDDIR
?
0.040
(0.31)
-0.036
(0.23)
-0.288 (0.05)
lnB_SIZE
-0.031
(0.02)
EQUITY_INCENTIVES ?
No. of observations
8,950
8,889
8,763
2
R
16.36%
3.07%
1.05%
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The table presents OLS regression results for equation (6) after controlling for other corporate
governance. ∆lnC_PAY is the change in the natural logarithm of CEO salary and bonus.
∆lnT_PAY is the change in the natural logarithm of CEO total compensation (EXECUCOMP data
item TDC1). ∆lnL_PAY is the change in natural logarithm of CEO long-term compensation,
which is defined as the sum of restricted stock grants, value of option grants, and long-term
incentive payouts. All the compensation measures are adjusted to 2003 dollars using Consumer
Price Index. ∆ROA is the change in earnings before extraordinary items, scaled by lagged total
assets. ADJ_RET is the firm’s annual size-adjusted stock return. POS_∆DA is the positive
changes in discretionary accruals. NEG_∆DA is the negative changes in discretionary accruals.
HORIZON is an indicator variable equal to one if CEOs are in each of the final two years prior to
their retirement, and zero otherwise. COOPTED_CC is an indicator variable equal to one if the
majority of compensation committee directors are appointed after the incumbent CEO assumes
office, and zero otherwise. lnCEO_TENURE is the natural logarithm of CEO tenure.
CEO_CHAIR is an indicator variable equal to one if CEO is the chairman of the board of
directors, and zero otherwise. B_INDDIR is an indicator variable equal to one if the board of
directors solely consists of outsiders, and zero otherwise. lnB_SIZE is the natural logarithm of a
number of directors on the board. EQUITY_INCENTIVES is the CEO's dollar wealth increase
from a 1% change in stock price, as measured in Core and Guay (2002). The p-values are
presented in parentheses and are one-tailed for coefficients that have the predicted sign and twotailed for those without a predicted sign or those that do not have the predicted sign. The standard
errors are heteroskedasticity robust, clustered by firm and year. For the sake of brevity, we do not
report coefficient estimates for year indicators.
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Panel D: The effect of compensation committee dominated by co-opted directors on CEO
compensation for the subsample of 2004-2011
Dependent Variable = lnT_PAY
Variable
Predicted Sign
Coefficient
p-value
Intercept
4.696
(<0.01)
+
0.067
(<0.01)
COOPTED_CC
+
0.373
(<0.01)
SIZE
+
0.146
(<0.01)
RET
+
0.998
(<0.01)
ROA
+
0.001
(0.41)
CEO_TENURE
?
-0.003
(<0.01)
CEO_OWNERSHIP
+
0.112
(<0.01)
CEO_CHAIR
?
0.515
(<0.01)
B_INDEPENDENCE
0.000
(<0.01)
B_OWNERSHIP
+
0.012
(0.01)
B_SIZE
?
-0.009
(0.65)
B_FEMALE
Observations
6,618
2
R
46.26%
This table presents regression results of model (2) for the subsample of 2004-2011. lnT_PAY is
the natural logarithm of CEO total compensation (EXECUCOMP data item TDC1). It is
adjusted to 2003 dollars using Consumer Price Index. COOPTED_CC is an indicator variable
equal to one if the majority of compensation committee directors are appointed after the
incumbent CEO assumes office, and zero otherwise. SIZE is the natural logarithm of sales. RET
is the firm’s stock return. ROA is the earnings before extraordinary item divided by total assets.
CEO_TENURE is the CEO tenure. CEO_OWNERSHIP is the proportion of the firm's
outstanding shares held by CEO. CEO_CHAIR is an indicator variable equal to one if CEO is
the chairman of the board of directors, and zero otherwise. B_INDEPENDENCE is the
proportion of outsiders on the board of directors. B_OWNERSHIP is the proportion of the
firm's outstanding shares held by directors on the board. B_SIZE is the number of directors on
the board. B_FEMALE is an indicator equal to one if at least one of the directors on the board
is female, and zero otherwise. The p-values are presented in parentheses and are one-tailed for
coefficients that have the predicted sign and two-tailed for those without a predicted sign or
those that do not have the predicted sign. The standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust,
clustered by firm and year. For the sake of brevity, we do not report coefficient estimates for
year indicators and G index dummies.
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Panel E: The effect of whether compensation committees are dominated by co-opted
directors on the association between R&D spending and CEO horizon problem for the
subsample of 2004-2011
Dependent Variable = RD
Variable
Predicted Sign
Coefficient
P-value
Intercept
0.034
(<0.01)
?
0.003
(0.39)
HORIZON
?
0.004
(<0.01)
COOPTED_CC
-0.004
(0.19)
HORIZON×COOPTED_CC
+
0.002
(0.07)
TOBINS_Q
+
-0.004
(0.03)
LAG_RET
+
-0.213
(<0.01)
FCF
0.237
(<0.01)
ROA
?
-0.001
(0.27)
SIZE
0.000
(<0.01)
FIRM_AGE
+
0.000
(0.15)
EQUITY_INCENTIVES
+
0.049
(<0.01)
INDUSTRY_RD
Number of observations
3,580
R2
49.40%
The table presents OLS regressions results of model (3) for the subsample of 2004-2011.
RD is the R&D expense scaled by total assets. COOPTED_CC is an indicator variable
equal to one if the majority of compensation committee directors are appointed after the
incumbent CEO assumes, and zero otherwise. HORIZON is an indicator variable equal
to one if CEOs are in each of the final two years prior to their retirement, and zero
otherwise. TOBINS_Q is calculated as the market value of equity plus the book value of
debt, all scaled by total assets. LAG_RET is the stock return from previous year. FCF is
the operating cash flows plus R&D expense minus capital expenditures, all scaled by
sales. ROA is operating net income before R&D expense scaled by assets. SIZE is the
natural logarithm of total assets at the beginning of the current year. FIRM_AGE is the
number of years between the current year and the first year the company listed on
Compustat. EQUITY_INCENTIVES is the CEO's dollar wealth increase from a 1%
change in stock price, as measured in Core and Guay (2002). INDUSTRY_RD is the
average R&D expenditures of other firms in the same 2-digit SIC industry. The p-values
are presented in parentheses and are one-tailed for coefficients that have the predicted
sign and two-tailed for those without a predicted sign or those that do not have the
predicted sign. The standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust, clustered by firm and
year. For the sake of brevity, we do not report coefficient estimates for year indicators.
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Panel F: The effect of whether compensation committees are dominated by co-opted
directors on the association between discretionary accruals and CEO horizon problem for
the subsample of 2004-2011
Dependent Variable = DA
Variable
Predicted Sign
Coefficient
P-value
Intercept
0.029
(0.85)
+
-0.066
(0.42)
HORIZON
?
-0.059
(0.04)
COOPTED_CC
+
0.165
(0.05)
HORIZON×COOPTED_CC
+
0.035
(0.31)
EQUITY_INCENTIVES
-0.005
(0.34)
SIZE
?
-0.755
(0.27)
STD_CASHFLOW
?
0.209
(0.21)
STD_REV
?
0.221
(0.05)
STD_SALESGROWTH
?
0.036
(0.25)
OLDFIRM
?
-0.007
(0.95)
LEVERAGE
?
-0.004
(0.55)
MARKETTOBOOK
Number of observations
5,248
R2
5.34%
The table presents OLS regressions results of model (4) for the subsample of 2004-2011. DA is
the discretionary accruals. COOPTED_CC is an indicator variable equal to one if the majority of
compensation committee directors are appointed after the incumbent CEO assumes office, and
zero otherwise. HORIZON is an indicator variable equal to one if CEOs are in each of the final
two years prior to their retirement, and zero otherwise. EQUITY_INCENTIVES is the dollar
change in CEO's wealth from a 1% change in stock price, as measured in Core and Guay (2002),
then normalized by the sum of the dollar change, salary and bonus. SIZE is the natural logarithm
of total assets at the beginning of the current year. STD_CASHFLOW is the standard deviation
of cash flows from operations deflated by total assets over the current and previous four years.
STD_REV is the standard deviation of sales deflated by total assets over the current and previous
four years. STD_SALESGROWTH is the standard deviation of sales growth over the current and
previous four years. OLDFIRM equals one if a firm is listed on Compustat for more than 20
years, and zero otherwise. LEVERAGE is total liabilities deflated by total assets.
MARKETTOBOOK represents deciles of market value of assets divided by the book value of
assets ranked within each year. The p-values are presented in parentheses and are one-tailed for
coefficients that have the predicted sign and two-tailed for those without a predicted sign or
those that do not have the predicted sign. The standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust,
clustered by firm and year. For the sake of brevity, we do not report coefficient estimates for
year indicators, G_index indicators, exchange indicators and industry indicators.
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Panel G Regression Results: The effect of compensation committee dominated by coopted directors on adjusting CEO compensation to mitigate R&D reduction for the
subsample of 2004-2011
Dependent Variable
∆lnC_PAY (1)
∆lnT_PAY (2)
∆lnL_PAY (3)
Pred.
Sign
Variable
Coeff. P-value
Coeff. P-value
Coeff. P-value
Intercept
-0.015 (0.11)
-0.014 (0.57)
-0.037
(0.57)
+
0.521 (<0.01)
1.642 (<0.01)
1.536
(0.05)
∆ROA
+
0.043
(0.23)
0.056
(0.39)
0.534
(0.14)
ADJ_RET
?
0.013
(0.98)
1.501
(0.20)
7.097
(0.23)
∆RD
?
0.051
(0.14)
-0.076 (0.25)
-0.708
(0.18)
HORIZON
?
0.017
(0.10)
0.012
(0.64)
0.028
(0.76)
COOPTED_CC
0.171
(0.62)
-0.468 (0.23)
4.580
(0.52)
HORIZON×∆ROA
+
0.205
(0.19)
0.199
(0.33)
-6.871
(0.12)
HORIZON×RET
?
-4.445 (0.09)
-1.867 (0.73)
-71.730 (0.17)
HORIZON×∆RD
HORIZON×COOP
?
-0.047 (0.28)
0.005
(0.95)
0.797
(0.20)
TED_CC
COOPTED_CC×∆
?
0.309
(0.62)
0.553
(0.71)
-7.901
(0.22)
RD
HORIZON×COOP
3.954
(0.19)
0.162
(0.98)
23.745 (0.78)
TED_CC×∆RD
EQUITY_INCENTI
?
0.000
(0.57)
VES
No. of observations
3,450
3,435
3,409
R2
20.59%
2.66%
1.80%
The table presents OLS regressions results of equation (5) for the subsample of 2004-2011.
∆lnC_PAY is the change in the natural logarithm of CEO salary and bonus. ∆lnT_PAY is the
change in the natural logarithm of CEO total compensation (EXECUCOMP data item TDC1).
∆lnL_PAY is the change in natural logarithm of CEO long-term compensation, which is
defined as the sum of restricted stock grants, value of option grants, and long-term incentive
payouts. All the compensation measures are adjusted to 2003 dollars using Consumer Price
Index. ∆ROA is the change in earnings before extraordinary items, scaled by lagged total
assets. ADJ_RET is the firm’s annual size-adjusted stock return. ∆RD is the change in R&D
expenditures, scaled by lagged total assets. HORIZON is an indicator variable equal to one if
CEOs are in each of the final two years prior to their retirement, and zero otherwise.
COOPTED_CC is an indicator variable equal to one if the majority of compensation
committee directors are appointed after the incumbent CEO assumes office, and zero
otherwise. EQUITY_INCENTIVES is the CEO's dollar wealth increase from a 1% change in
stock price, as measured in Core and Guay (2002). The p-values are presented in parentheses
and are two-tailed. The standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust, clustered by firm and
year. For the sake of brevity, we do not report coefficient estimates for year indicators.
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Panel H: The effect of compensation committee dominated by co-opted directors on
adjusting CEO compensation to mitigate income-increasing accruals management for the
subsample of 2004-2011
Dependent Variable
∆lnC_PAY (1)
∆lnT_PAY (2)
∆lnL_PAY (3)
Pred. Sign
Variable
Coeff. P-value
Coeff.
P-value
Coeff. P-value
Intercept
-0.011
(0.18)
0.017
(0.40)
0.028
(0.70)
+
0.563 (<0.01)
1.495
(<0.01)
1.962 (<0.01)
∆ROA
+
0.073
(0.06)
0.173
(0.12)
1.006
(0.02)
ADJ_RET
?
0.002
(0.73)
-0.024
(0.11)
0.058
(0.67)
POS_∆DA
?
0.015
(0.01)
-0.006
(0.64)
-0.076 (0.11)
NEG_∆DA
?
0.071
(0.04)
-0.054
(0.30)
-0.334 (0.06)
HORIZON
?
0.019
(0.03)
0.019
(0.31)
0.036
(0.65)
COOPTED_CC
HORIZON×∆R
-0.180
(0.27)
-0.479
(0.19)
2.150
(0.65)
OA
+
0.252
(0.12)
0.090
(0.40)
-4.157 (0.09)
HORIZON×RET
HORIZON×POS
?
-0.009
(0.59)
-0.051
(0.23)
-0.886 (0.24)
_∆DA
HORIZON×NE
?
0.011
(0.71)
0.025
(0.49)
0.016
(0.90)
G_∆DA
HORIZON×CO
?
-0.111
(0.01)
-0.029
(0.64)
0.177
(0.58)
OPTED_CC
COOPTED_CC
?
-0.009
(0.22)
0.002
(0.92)
-0.069 (0.63)
×POS_∆DA
COOPTED_CC
?
-0.016
(0.03)
0.013
(0.46)
0.076
(0.28)
×NEG_∆DA
HORIZON×CO
0.043
(0.04)
0.029
(0.30)
0.861
(0.12)
OPTED_CC×P
+
OS_∆DA
HORIZON×CO
?
-0.027
(0.40)
-0.028
(0.59)
0.058
(0.77)
OPTED_CC×N
EG_∆DA
EQUITY_INCE
?
0.000
(0.41)
NTIVES
No. of
5,614
5,579
5,524
observations
21.05%
2.78%
1.14%
R2
The table presents OLS regression results of model (6) for the sample of 2004-2011. ∆lnC_PAY is
the change in the natural logarithm of CEO salary and bonus. ∆lnT_PAY is the change in the
natural logarithm of CEO total compensation (EXECUCOMP data item TDC1). ∆lnL_PAY is the
change in natural logarithm of CEO long-term compensation, which is defined as the sum of
restricted stock grants, value of option grants, and long-term incentive payouts. All the
compensation measures are adjusted to 2003 dollars using Consumer Price Index. ∆ROA is the
change in earnings before extraordinary items, scaled by lagged total assets. ADJ_RET is the
firm’s annual size-adjusted stock return. POS_∆DA is the positive changes in discretionary
accruals. NEG_∆DA is the negative changes in discretionary accruals. HORIZON is an indicator
variable equal to one if CEOs are in each of the final two years prior to their retirement, and zero
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otherwise. COOPTED_CC is an indicator variable equal to one if the majority of compensation
committee directors are appointed after the incumbent CEO assumes office, and zero otherwise.
EQUITY_INCENTIVES is the CEO's dollar wealth increase from a 1% change in stock price, as
measured in Core and Guay (2002). The p-values are presented in parentheses and are one-tailed
for coefficients that have the predicted sign and two-tailed for those without a predicted sign or
those that do not have the predicted sign. The standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust,
clustered by firm and year. For the sake of brevity, we do not report coefficient estimates for year
indicators.
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TABLE 11 Pearson Correlations between the Board and Compensation Committee Characteristics Variables

1.B_INDEPENDENCE
2.CC_INDEPENDENCE
3.B_COOPTION
4.CC_COOPTION
5.B_LONGSERV
6.CC_LONGSERV
7.B_SIZE
8.CC_SIZE
9.B_OWNERSHIP
10.CC_OWNERSHIP
11.B_BUSY
12.CC_BUSY
13.CEO_CHAIR
14.IND_NORM
15.COOPTED_CC
16.COOPTED_B

1

2

3

4

5

1
0.57
-0.01
-0.03
-0.03
-0.02
0.01
0.03
-0.24
-0.13
0.12
0.07
0.01
0.51
-0.02
-0.01

-0.01
0.02
0.00
-0.01
0.00
0.00
-0.14
-0.21
0.02
0.03
-0.03
0.42
0.02
-0.01

0.91
0.00
-0.03
0.02
0.02
0.04
-0.00
-0.09
-0.07
0.19
-0.01
0.80
0.87

0.01
-0.06
0.01
0.02
0.05
-0.02
-0.09
-0.07
0.17
0.00
0.90
0.81

0.69
-0.00
0.00
0.01
0.01
-0.02
-0.02
-0.02
-0.02
0.01
0.00

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

0.00
-0.00 0.99
0.01 -0.01 -0.02
0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.66
-0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.05 -0.02
-0.00 0.02 0.02 -0.03 -0.03 0.79
-0.02 0.05 0.03 0.01 -0.02 0.10 0.08
-0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.14 -0.10 0.01 -0.00 -0.04
-0.05 0.01 0.01 0.04 -0.02 -0.08 -0.06 0.15 -0.00
-0.03 0.01 0.01 0.03 -0.01 -0.07 -0.06 0.18 -0.02
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15

0.77

This panel displays the Pearson correlations between the board and compensation committee characteristics variables. Correlations significant
at the 5% level or less appear in bold. CC_COOPTION is the proportion of directors who are appointed after the CEO assumes office on the
compensation committee. B_COOPTION is the proportion of directors who are appointed after the CEO assumes office on the board of
directors. COOPTED_CC is an indicator variable equal to one if the majority of compensation committee directors are appointed after the
incumbent CEO assumes office, and zero otherwise. COOPTED_B is an indicator variable equal to one if the majority of directors on the
board are appointed after the incumbent CEO assumes office, and zero otherwise. CEO_CHAIR is an indicator variable equal to one if CEO is
the chairman of the board of directors, and zero otherwise. B_INDEPENDENCE is the proportion of outsiders on the board of directors.
CC_INDEPENDENCE is the proportion of outsiders on the compensation committee. IND_NORM is an indicator variable equal to one if the
firm has a nominating committee that consists of only outside directors. CC_SIZE is the number of directors on the compensation committee.
B_SIZE is the number of directors on the board of directors. B_BUSY is the proportion of board directors who sit on more than three other
boards of public companies. CC_BUSY is the proportion of compensation committee directors who sit on more than three other boards of
public companies. B_LONGSERV is the average tenure of directors on the board. CC_LONGSERV is the average tenure of directors on the
compensation committee. CC_OWNERSHIP is the total shares held by directors on the compensation committee divided by total outstanding
shares. B_OWNERSHIP is the total shares held by directors on the board divided by total outstanding shares. B_SIZE is the number of
directors on the board.
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TABLE 12 Factors Identified in Principal Components Analysis
Board and Compensation Committee
Factor
Factor
Factor Name
characteristics
Loadings
1
0.959
CEO_POWER
CC_COOPTION
0.951
B_COOPTION
0.919
COOPTED_CC
0.916
COOPTED_B
0.269
CEO_CHAIR
2
0.848
INDEPENDENCE
B_INDEPENDENCE
0.794
CC_INDEPENDENCE
0.793
IND_NORM
3
0.996
DIR_SIZE
CC_SIZE
0.996
B_SIZE
4
0.936
BUSY_DIR
B_BUSY
0.93
CC_BUSY
5
0.919
DIR_TENURE
B_LONGSERV
0.918
CC_LONGSERV
6
0.909
DIR_OWNERSHIP
CC_OWNERSHIP
0.896
B_OWNERSHIP
This table presents the 6 factors identified in Principal Components Analysis. CC_COOPTION is
the proportion of directors who are appointed after the CEO assumes office on the compensation
committee. B_COOPTION is the proportion of directors who are appointed after the CEO assumes
office on the board of directors. COOPTED_CC is an indicator variable equal to one if the majority
of compensation committee directors are appointed after the incumbent CEO assumes office, and
zero otherwise. COOPTED_B is an indicator variable equal to one if the majority of directors on
the board are appointed after the incumbent CEO assumes office, and zero otherwise. CEO_CHAIR
is an indicator variable equal to one if CEO is the chairman of the board of directors, and zero
otherwise. B_INDEPENDENCE is the proportion of outsiders on the board of directors.
CC_INDEPENDENCE is the proportion of outsiders on the compensation committee. IND_NORM
is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm has a nominating committee that consists of only
outside directors. CC_SIZE is the number of directors on the compensation committee. B_SIZE is
the number of directors on the board of directors. B_BUSY is the proportion of board directors who
sit on more than three other boards of public companies. CC_BUSY is the proportion of
compensation committee directors who sit on more than three other boards of public companies.
B_LONGSERV is the average tenure of directors on the board. CC_LONGSERV is the average
tenure of directors on the compensation committee. CC_OWNERSHIP is the total shares held by
directors on the compensation committee divided by total outstanding shares. B_OWNERSHIP is
the total shares held by directors on the board divided by total outstanding shares. B_SIZE is the
number of directors on the board.
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TABLE 13 Regression Results: The effect of board and compensation committee factors on
CEO compensation
Variable
Pred. Sign
Coeff.
p-value
Intercept
5.220
(<0.01)
+
0.083
(<0.01)
CEO_POWER
0.013
(0.14)
DIR_INDEPENDENCE
?
-0.071
(0.20)
DIR_SIZE
+
0.081
(<0.01)
BUSY_DIR
+
0.000
(0.49)
DIR_TENURE
-0.091
(<0.01)
DIR_OWNERSHIP
+
0.366
(<0.01)
SIZE
+
0.109
(<0.01)
RET
+
1.139
(<0.01)
ROA
+
-0.002
(0.28)
CEO_TENURE
?
-0.003
(<0.01)
CEO_OWNERSHIP
Observations
13,585
2
R
40.47%
The table presents regression analysis of the effect of board and compensation committee factors
on CEO compensation. lnT_PAY is the natural logarithm of CEO total compensation
(EXECUCOMP data item TDC1). It is adjusted to 2003 dollars using Consumer Price Index.
CEO_POWER is the factor on which CC_COOPTION, B_COOPTION, COOPTED_CC,
COOPTED_B, and CEO_CHAIR have high loadings. DIR_INDEPENDENCE is the factor on
which B_INDEPENDENCE, CC_INDEPENDENCE, and IND_NORM have high loadings.
DIR_SIZE is the factor on which CC_SIZE and B_SIZE have high loadings. BUSY_DIR is the
factor on which B_BUSY and CC_BUSY have high loadings. DIR_TENURE is the factor on
which B_LONGSERV and CC_LONGSERV have high loadings. DIR_OWNERSHIP is the factor
on which CC_OWNERSHIP and B_OWNERSHIP have high loadings. SIZE is the natural
logarithm of sales. RET is the firm’s stock return. ROA is the earnings before extraordinary item
divided by total assets. CEO_TENURE is the CEO tenure. CEO_OWNERSHIP is the proportion
of outstanding shares held by CEO. The p-values are presented in parentheses and are two-tailed.
The standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust, clustered by firm and year. For the sake of
brevity, we do not report coefficient estimates for year indicators and G index dummies.
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TABLE 14 Regression Results: The effect of board and compensation committee factors on
the association between R&D spending and CEO horizon problem
Variable
Pred. Sign
Coeff.
p-value
Intercept
0.017
(<0.01)
HORIZON
?
0.001
(0.60)
?
0.002
(0.00)
CEO_POWER
?
0.003
(<0.01)
DIR_INDEPENDENCE
?
-0.051
(<0.01)
DIR_SIZE
?
0.002
(0.01)
BUSY_DIR
?
0.003
(0.27)
DIR_TENURE
?
-0.002
(0.01)
DIR_OWNERSHIP
-0.003
(0.03)
HORIZON×CEO_POWER
HORIZON×DIR_INDEPENDE
+
-0.001
(0.46)
NCE
?
0.016
(0.18)
HORIZON×DIR_SIZE
-0.001
(0.25)
HORIZON×BUSY_DIR
-0.015
(0.02)
HORIZON×DIR_TENURE
+
-0.001
(0.20)
HORIZON×DIR_OWNERSHIP
+
0.005
(<0.01)
TOBINS_Q
+
-0.007
(<0.01)
LAG_RET
+
-0.193
(<0.01)
FCF
0.184
(<0.01)
ROA
?
0.001
(0.06)
SIZE
-0.000
(<0.01)
FIRM_AGE
+
-0.001
(0.46)
EQUITY_INCENTIVES
+
0.064
(<0.01)
INDUSTRY_RD
Number of observations
5,589
R2

49.07%
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The table presents the regression analysis of the effect of board and compensation committee
factors on mitigating opportunistic R&D reduction. RD is the R&D expense scaled by total assets.
HORIZON is an indicator variable equal to one if CEOs are in each of the final two years prior to
their retirement, and zero otherwise. CEO_POWER is the factor on which CC_COOPTION,
B_COOPTION, COOPTED_CC, COOPTED_B, and CEO_CHAIR have high loadings.
DIR_INDEPENDENCE is the factor on which B_INDEPENDENCE, CC_INDEPENDENCE, and
IND_NORM have high loadings. DIR_SIZE is the factor on which CC_SIZE and B_SIZE have
high loadings. BUSY_DIR is the factor on which B_BUSY and CC_BUSY have high loadings.
DIR_TENURE is the factor on which B_LONGSERV and CC_LONGSERV have high loadings.
DIR_OWNERSHIP is the factor on which CC_OWNERSHIP and B_OWNERSHIP have high
loadings. TOBINS_Q is calculated as the market value of equity plus the book value of debt, all
scaled by total assets. LAG_RET is the firm’s stock return from previous year. FCF is the
operating cash flows plus R&D expense minus capital expenditures, all scaled by sales. ROA is
operating net income before R&D expense scaled by assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total
assets at the beginning of the current year. FIRM_AGE is the natural logarithm of the number of
years between year t and the first year the company listed on Compustat. EQUITY_INCENTIVES
is the natural logarithm of the CEO's dollar wealth increase from a 1% change in stock price, as
measured in Core and Guay (2002). INDUSTRY_RD is the average R&D expenditures of other
firms in the same 2-digit SIC industry. The p-values are presented in parentheses and are twotailed. The standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust, clustered by firm and year. For the sake
of brevity, we do not report coefficient estimates for year indicators.
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TABLE 15 Regression Results: The effect of board and compensation committee factors on
the association between discretionary accruals and CEO horizon problem
Variable
Predicted Sign
Coefficient
p-value
Intercept
0.212
(0.08)
HORIZON
?
0.012
(0.71)
?
-0.019
(0.08)
CEO_POWER
?
-0.011
(0.36)
DIR_INDEPENDENCE
?
0.130
(0.08)
DIR_SIZE
?
-0.005
(0.61)
BUSY_DIR
?
0.002
(0.42)
DIR_TENURE
?
-0.003
(0.39)
DIR_OWNERSHIP
+
0.018
(0.30)
HORIZON×CEO_POWER
HORIZON×DIR_INDEPEND
0.018
(0.61)
ENCE
?
-0.439
(0.02)
HORIZON×DIR_SIZE
+
0.017
(0.28)
HORIZON×BUSY_DIR
+
-0.192
(0.14)
HORIZON×DIR_TENURE
HORIZON×DIR_OWNERSHI
0.023
(0.10)
P
+
0.047
(0.35)
EQUITY_INCENTIVES
-0.008
(0.40)
SIZE
?
-0.793
(0.07)
STD_CASHFLOW
?
0.141
(0.20)
STD_REV
?
-0.008
(0.90)
STD_SALESGROWTH
?
0.019
(0.42)
OLDFIRM
?
-0.002
(0.97)
LEVERAGE
?
-0.005
(0.32)
MARKETTOBOOK
Number of observations
8,526
R2

4.72%
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The table reports regression analysis of the effect of board and compensation committee factors
on mitigating opportunistic accruals management. CEO_POWER is the factor on which
CC_COOPTION, B_COOPTION, COOPTED_CC, COOPTED_B, and CEO_CHAIR have high
loadings. DIR_INDEPENDENCE is the factor on which B_INDEPENDENCE,
CC_INDEPENDENCE, and IND_NORM have high loadings. DIR_SIZE is the factor on which
CC_SIZE and B_SIZE have high loadings. BUSY_DIR is the factor on which B_BUSY and
CC_BUSY have high loadings. DIR_TENURE is the factor on which B_LONGSERV and
CC_LONGSERV have high loadings. DIR_OWNERSHIP is the factor on which
CC_OWNERSHIP and B_OWNERSHIP have high loadings. EQUITY_INCENTIVES is the dollar
change in CEO's wealth from a 1% change in stock price, as measured in Core and Guay (2002),
then normalized by the sum of the dollar change, salary and bonus. SIZE is the natural logarithm
of total assets at the beginning of the current year. STD_CASHFLOW is the standard deviation of
cash flows from operations deflated by total assets over the current and previous four years.
STD_REV is the standard deviation of sales deflated by total assets over the current and previous
four years. STD_SALESGROWTH is the standard deviation of sales growth over the current and
previous four years. OLDFIRM equals one if a firm is listed on Compustat for more than 20
years, and zero otherwise. LEVERAGE is total liabilities deflated by total assets.
MARKETTOBOOK represents deciles of market value of assets divided by the book value of
assets ranked within each year. The p-values are presented in parentheses and are two-tailed. The
standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust, clustered by firm and year. For the sake of brevity,
we do not report coefficient estimates for year indicators, G_index indicators, exchange
indicators, and industry indicators.
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